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Can Religious Influence 
Ever Be “Undue” Influence? 
Jeffrey G. Sherman† 
[T]here are no instances where men are so easily imposed upon as at 
the time of their dying, under pretense of charity . . . . 
Attorney-General v. Bains1  
The short answer to my title’s question is “yes.” The 
longer answer is, well, longer. The Lord Chancellor’s quoted 
remark about charity and deathbed susceptibility reflects our 
law’s longstanding uneasiness with eleventh-hour charitable 
bequests and our courts’ struggle to differentiate between a 
testator’s own independent charitable impulses and those 
imposed on her by an outsider playing upon her fears or 
weakness. The Bains case itself involved an improperly 
executed will.2 The defective will contained a charitable 
bequest, and the Chancellor was asked to rule that the bequest 
was nonetheless effective (as an appointment), presumably 
because of the longstanding judicial policy favoring transfers to 
charity.3 He refused.4 A lack of proper execution may suggest 
  
 † Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. A.B., 1968, J.D., 1972, Harvard. In writing this Article, I have benefited 
greatly from the advice and wisdom of Daniel Hamilton and Steven Heyman, and I am 
grateful for their assistance. And I should like to thank the Marshall D. Ewell 
Research Fund for supporting my work on this project. 
 1 Prec. Ch. 270, 272, 24 Eng. Rep. 131, 131 (1708). A similar—indeed, 
possibly identical—case is reported as Attorney-General v. Barnes, Gilbert Eq. Ca. 5, 25 
Eng. Rep. 4 (1708).  
 2 Strictly speaking, the term “will” states a legal conclusion about a 
document: that the document has been validated (provisionally, at least) by a probate 
court. Until such validation occurs, the document is only a “purported will.” See, e.g., 
Stephen v. Huckaba, 838 N.E.2d 347, 350 (Ill. App. 2005). Similarly, until a purported 
will is admitted to probate, the maker of that will is not a testator but only an 
“apparent testator.” See, e.g., Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 633 S.E.2d 722, 726 
(S.C. 2006). In the interests of simplicity, however, I shall follow custom and use only 
the words “will” or “testator” in this Article except in those instances where “purported 
will” or “apparent testator” is necessary to avoid ambiguity. 
 3 See GARETH JONES, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF CHARITY 1532-1827, at 3-4 
(1969). Jones writes: 
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that a testator was subjected to undue influence at the time her 
will was written,5 and the Chancellor implied by his remarks 
that the presence of a charitable bequest in the will made the 
suggestion of undue influence—and therefore of invalidity—
more plausible rather than less. 
An extreme, but not unrepresentative, example of the 
circumstances the Chancellor had in mind can be found in the 
facts of In re Estate of Hee.6 The testator, Louis Hee, was an 
elderly man living alone and in extreme ill health.7 Indeed, he 
was bedridden, and none of his relatives lived nearby.8 A few 
months before Hee’s death, some members of the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses called at his home to interest him in their literature 
and religious beliefs, and their visits were soon followed by 
other members on a similar mission.9 (Hee had never been and 
never became a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses.10) One of 
these visitors, John Hartley, Jr., proceeded to prepare for Hee’s 
signature a will making the Watch Tower Bible and Tract 
Society of Pennsylvania (the parent organization of the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses) Hee’s sole legatee.11 Some seventy-five 
days before Hee’s death, Hartley, accompanied by two other 
members of Jehovah’s Witnesses, traveled to Hee’s home and 
obtained his signature on the will.12 Hartley immediately sent 
the executed will to the main office of the Watch Tower Bible 
  
Many privileges were [in the years before the Reformation] granted to the 
charitable legacy which were denied to the private legacy. For example, no 
charitable legacy was allowed to fail because it was too indefinite, and 
generous rules of construction were developed to cure the uncertainty. So, a 
testator who had bequeathed [personal] property ‘to the church’ was deemed 
to have bequeathed it to his parish church . . . .  
Id. at 5. As to privileges accorded charitable legacies under more recent law, see infra 
notes 74-76 and 85. 
  The frustratingly brief published report of Bains does not clearly explicate 
the petitioner’s argument for validating the charitable transfer. Nonetheless, the 
Chancellor’s quoted remark strongly—albeit circumstantially—supports my 
assumption that the petitioner directly or indirectly invoked this policy of favoritism 
toward charities.  
 4 Bains, Prec. Ch. at 272, 24 Eng. Rep. at 132. 
 5 See, e.g., Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of 
Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 4-5 (1941). 
 6 Hartley v. Toth (In re Estate of Hee), 252 So. 2d 846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1971). 
 7 Id. at 847. 
 8 Id.  
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
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and Tract Society of Pennsylvania.13 No copy of the will was left 
with the testator, and indeed no disclosure of the will’s 
existence was made until after Hee’s death.14 Hee’s siblings 
contested the will on the ground of the undue influence of 
Hartley and others, and quite appropriately the siblings 
succeeded.15 
For centuries, Anglo-American courts and legislatures 
entertained suspicions of gifts to charities generally and to 
religious charities in particular. During the late middle ages, a 
time when the culture at large was deeply religious, these 
suspicions amounted to outright hostility generated by the 
fears of the feudal aristocracy.16 Later, as notions of 
testamentary freedom took hold, two other concerns replaced 
the feudal ones. First, lawmakers began to have misgivings 
about the amount of wealth that charitable bequests removed 
from the stream of unimpeded commerce: 
[B]y the specious pretence of charity, the solicitations of [potential 
charitable donees], and the pride and vanity of donors, it is to me 
highly probable, that too great a part of the lands in this kingdom 
may soon come to be [held in perpetuity by charitable foundations], 
to the prejudice of the nation in general, and to the ruin or unjust 
disappointment of many a man’s poor relations . . . .17  
And second, they were concerned that “the church was 
taking advantage of . . . the [deathbed] fears of the faithful for 
its own aggrandizement.”18 These concerns, for the welfare of 
the commonwealth and for the security of testators, led 
Parliament and many American legislatures to enact statutes, 
  
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. at 848. 
 16 See infra text accompanying notes 24-51. 
 17 These words were spoken by a member of the English House of Lords in a 
1736 floor debate on a piece of legislation that barred charitable devises of land. See 
JONES, supra note 3, at 110-11. For a discussion of this 1736 legislation, see infra text 
accompanying notes 103-111. 
 18 A.H. Oosterhoff, The Law of Mortmain: An Historical and Comparative 
Review, 27 U. TORONTO L.J. 257, 267 (1977). Indeed, “some [eighteenth century] 
legislators expressed a distrust of the clergy and a belief that a failure to control 
conveyances in trust for charitable uses would result in a renewal of death-bed vigils 
on the part of ambitious clerics.” Id. at 282. These concerns were not without historical 
foundation. As early as the thirteenth century, in response to a papal decree, English 
testators who bequeathed nothing ad pias causas (for pious purposes) “might be denied 
the Eucharist and interred in unconsecrated ground.” JONES, supra note 3, at 3. 
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often called mortmain statutes, placing limits on testamentary 
transfers to charity.19  
Between 1976 and 1998, the last eleven American 
mortmain statutes were repealed or overturned,20 but their 
repeal did not reflect any observed changes in human nature. 
On the contrary, the human frailties that had prompted the 
statutes’ original enactment continued to mar the legal 
landscape as before. The statutes were repealed because they 
were unworkable, not because they were unnecessary. 
Undergirding the repeal movement was a belief that the law of 
undue influence could be relied upon to prevent, in individual 
cases, the kinds of imposition that the mortmain statutes’ 
broader brush was designed to reach.21 But the law of undue 
influence can serve as an adequate substitute for mortmain 
statutes only if courts treat the influence of charitable or 
religious actors with the same wariness as they exhibit with 
secular, avowedly materialistic actors. And, unfortunately, 
courts have sometimes displayed an inappropriate indulgence 
  
 19 “Mortmain” means “dead hand” in the Anglo-Norman variant of French 
spoken in England during the Late Middle Ages. The most widely accepted explanation 
of the term’s invention and application is that given by Lord Coke:  
[T]he true cause of the name and the meaning thereof was taken from the 
effects as it is expressed in the statute itself . . . so as the lands were said to 
come to dead hands as to the lords for that by alienation in mortmaine they 
lost wholly their escheats, and in effect their knights-service for the defense 
of the realme, wards, marriages, reliefes and the like; and therefore was 
called a dead hand, for a dead hand yeeldeth no service.  
1 EDWARD COKE, A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON subdiv. 2.b (Phila., Robert H. Small 
1853) (15--?) (quoted in Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 259). 
  The “dead hand” metaphor enjoys continued vitality today, but its 
application has been broadened to include all the posthumous influences of testators. 
See generally ARTHUR HOBHOUSE, THE DEAD HAND (1880); Adam J. Hirsch & William 
K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1 (1992); Gareth H. 
Jones, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 
119 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977). (Actually, “dead hand” is more of a synecdoche 
than a metaphor.) 
 20 See infra note 124. 
 21 See, e.g., In re Estate of Kinyon, 615 P.2d 174, 175 (Mont. 1980) (noting 
that the annulment of the state’s mortmain statute “in no way abandons these 
safeguards [the prevention of overreaching by charities and the protection of the 
interests of relatives] since existing law is sufficient to prevent the abuses at which the 
mortmain statute was directed”); Mary F. Radford & F. Skip Sugarman, Georgia’s New 
Probate Code, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 605, 669-70 (1997) (explaining the reasons for 
Georgia’s repeal of its mortmain statute). See Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 294-95. 
Writing in 1951, one scholar argued that mortmain statutes should be retained and 
their prevalence increased because “[t]he legal principles of fraud, undue influence, or 
mental incapacity have not and do not meet the problem.” G. Stanley Joslin, Legal 
Restrictions on Gifts to Charities, 21 TENN. L. REV. 761, 763 (1951) (punctuation 
altered). 
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toward the former. While the old mortmain statutes 
themselves would be anachronisms in today’s estate planning 
climate of nonprobate transfers22 and split-interest giving,23 
American law still has much to learn from them as it confronts 
charitable bequests procured in dubious circumstances. 
In Part I of this Article, I shall discuss the long but 
ultimately unsatisfactory career enjoyed by mortmain statutes 
as bulwarks against undue religious or charitable influence. In 
Part II, I shall discuss the law of undue influence generally. 
And in Part III, I shall discuss how traditional undue influence 
law has fallen short in the context of religious bequests and 
how traditional law can be strengthened by a rule declaring 
that all relationships between a testator and her religious or 
spiritual advisor are per se “confidential relationships” for 
purposes of litigating any will contest. Such a rule would 
largely shift to the proponent of the will the burden of 
producing evidence supportive of the will’s validity.  
I. MORTMAIN STATUTES: THE TRADITIONAL LEGISLATIVE 
SOLUTION 
A. Early English Mortmain Law: A Public Law Response 
While American mortmain statutes were private law 
devices designed to protect the expectations of a charitably 
inclined testator’s family, the English mortmain restrictions 
began life as public law devices with a political purpose: 
protecting the feudal aristocracy.24 Under English law at the 
time of feudalism, all land was said to be held of the King. 
Every other person who had the right to occupy and cultivate a 
piece of land possessed that right only as a tenant—either a 
  
 22 Today, a decedent’s nonprobate transfers, such as life insurance and 
revocable inter vivos trusts, generally govern more of her property than a traditional 
will, John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of 
Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1108 (1984), and mortmain statutes were often held 
to apply only to wills and not to nonprobate transfers. See, e.g., Kent v. Katz (In re 
Estate of Katz), 528 So. 2d 422, 426-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (held not to apply to a 
revocable inter vivos trust); In re Will of Frank, 383 N.Y.S.2d 777, 779-80 (App. Div. 
1976) (same). 
 23 “Split-interest” trusts—that is, trusts in which one interest (say, a life 
income interest) is granted to or retained by an individual and another interest (say, 
the remainder interest) is granted to a charity—have become popular estate planning 
instruments to take advantage of favorable valuation rules to lessen the impact of 
transfer taxes, particularly for unmarried property owners who cannot avail 
themselves of the estate tax marital deduction. See, e.g., F. Ladson Boyle, Evaluating 
Split-Interest Valuation, 24 GA. L. REV. 1, 2-3, 28-40 (1989).  
 24 See Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 296. 
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tenant of the King himself or a tenant of another tenant of 
(another tenant of) the King25—and, as a condition of his 
continued tenure, he owed certain obligations to the person 
from whom he held that right (that is, his lord).26  
The most common form of feudal land tenure was 
“knight service,” pursuant to which the tenant owed military 
service to or on behalf of his lord. While historians have noted 
considerable variations in local customs, there seems to have 
been some agreement that a single knight’s fee should 
normally have comprised sufficient acreage to generate an 
annual income of about £20, so a tenant with sufficient acreage 
to produce, say, £60 of annual income would have owed his lord 
the service of three knights: the service of three fully armed 
horsemen to serve in the army for 40 days in the year in time of 
war.27 But of even more value to the lord than these obligations 
of military service were a number of financial obligations, 
known as the incidents of knight service. Among the most 
important of these feudal incidents were aids (a right to 
demand money from the tenant in certain circumstances of 
need),28 relief (a right to payment of a certain sum of money 
when an adult heir to the land assumed his inheritance upon 
the death of the prior tenant),29 wardship (a vendible right, 
  
 25 F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 24 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1979) (1908). But see SUSAN REYNOLDS, FIEFS AND VASSALS: 
THE MEDIEVAL EXPERIENCE REINTERPRETED (1994) (critiquing the conventional 
understanding of feudalism as a coherent, distinctive socio-legal system). 
 26 MAITLAND, supra note 25, at 25. If a named tenant’s lord was not the King 
himself but rather some other tenant of the King or a tenant of another tenant of the 
king, the lord of that named tenant was known as a mesne or intermediate lord. If a 
named tenant’s lord was the King himself, then there was no mesne lord and the 
tenant was one of the King’s tenants in chief (or tenants in capite). Id. at 24. 
 27 Id. at 25-26. “[T]he division of land into districts, each with an allotted 
quota of men and material, is a simple and obvious device; we find, for example, in 
1679 that an act in Virginia required each district to provide one man armed and 
mounted for service in the Indian wars.” THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE 
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 514 (5th ed. 1956) (citing Virginia Statutes at Large, ii, 
434, 435). 
 28 MAITLAND, supra note 25, at 27.  
[T]he lord can legitimately demand aid . . . from his tenant when [the lord] is 
in need of money. The aid has been considered as a free-will offering, but one 
which ought not to be refused when the demand is reasonable . . . [In the 
Magna Carta, King] John was compelled to promise that he would exact no 
aid without the common counsel of the realm save in three cases, namely in 
order to make his eldest son a knight, in order to marry his eldest daughter, 
and in order to redeem his body from captivity . . . . 
Id.  
 29 Id.  
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arising upon the death of a tenant leaving a minor child as 
heir, to enjoy the profits from the land until the child attained 
the age of twenty-one (if male) or fourteen (if female)),30 
marriage (a vendible right to sell the ward (that is, the 
deceased tenant’s minor child) in marriage),31 and escheat (the 
right to recover the tenanted land if the tenant died without an 
heir).32  
In general, a feudal lord cared very little about who his 
tenant was at any time, so long as he could be sure that the 
tenant had the means to meet his feudal obligations, and the 
ancillary rules of land law reflected the aristocracy’s 
indifference as to the tenant’s identity and its insistence on his 
material sufficiency. The system of primogeniture, which by 
the twelfth century had become the customary form of descent 
in England, assured the lord that his new tenant (the deceased 
tenant’s eldest son, to the exclusion of all other children of the 
decedent) would have the same means of providing knight 
  
If the tenant in knight service having an inheritable estate died leaving an 
heir of full age, that heir owed a relief for his land . . . a sum due on his 
taking up the fallen inheritance. . . . [Lords sometimes used the occasion to 
demand that the heir] buy the land at nearly its full price.  
Id. Eventually, it became common for the relief for a knight’s fee to be £100. Id. 
 30 Id. at 28. 
If the heir of a military tenant is under the age of twenty-one, being male, or 
fourteen, being female, the lord is entitled to wardship—to wardship of the 
body of his tenant, to wardship of the land also. This means that he can enjoy 
the lands for his own profit until the boy attains twenty-one or the girl 
fourteen. He is bound to maintain the child and he must not commit waste, 
but within these limits he may do what he likes with the land and take the 
profits to his own use—and this profitable right is a vendible commodity: 
wardships are freely bought and sold. 
Id. At least one authority maintains that the relevant age for females was sixteen, not 
fourteen. See Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 265. 
 31 See MAITLAND, supra note 25, at 28.  
[T]he lord can dispose of the ward’s marriage, can sell his ward in marriage. 
The only limit to this is that the match must be an equal one; the ward is not 
to be disparaged, married to one who is not his or her peer. At first 
apparently all that the lord claims is that his female tenant shall not marry 
without his consent—a demand which is reasonable enough while the 
military tenures are great realities:—my female tenant must not carry the 
land which she holds of me to a husband who is my enemy. But the right has 
grown far beyond this reason:—it is now [i.e., the end of Edward I’s reign] 
extended to males as well as females, and the marriage of every ward is a 
vendible commodity.  
Id. 
 32 See id. at 29 (“If the tenant died without an heir[,] the land escheated, that 
is, fell back to the lord—it became his to do what he pleased with.”). 
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service as his deceased ancestor had, since the land would 
never be subdivided upon the ancestor’s death.33 Further, under 
primogeniture, land was not subject to devise at all,34 except in 
certain privileged cities such as London.35 But, starting in 
about the year 1200, land was freely subject to inter vivos 
alienation, even in derogation of an eldest son’s expectations,36 
and the problems of mortmain originally arose in this inter 
vivos context. 
Two types of inter vivos land transfers particularly 
threatened the feudal lord’s interests. The first was 
subinfeudation, the creation of a subtenancy by a tenant.37 The 
subinfeudating tenant would transfer to another person a 
portion of the land that he held of his lord, thereby becoming 
an inferior lord to whom the new grantee owed feudal 
obligations.38 Subinfeudation created a risk for the original lord 
that his original tenant would, after the partial conveyance, 
have insufficient remaining assets to meet his original feudal 
obligations.39 At the behest of the feudal aristocracy, therefore, 
Parliament, as part of the famous Statute Quia emptores,40 
barred all subinfeudation but authorized alienation by 
substitution.41 A tenant could no longer convey part of his 
estate but could convey all of it by means of a substitution of 
holders of the tenancy:42 a substitution that presumably 
preserved the lord’s feudal rights.43  
The second kind of inter vivos conveyance that 
threatened the feudal lord was a conveyance to the Church,44 
  
 33 See PLUCKNETT, supra note 27, at 527. 
 34 A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 54 (2d ed. 1986). Personal 
property could be bequeathed, but jurisdiction over wills of personalty was vested in 
ecclesiastical courts, not in the secular courts. MAITLAND, supra note 25, at 523; 
PLUCKNETT, supra note 27, at 740-41; JONES, supra note 3, at 4. 
 35 JONES, supra note 3, at 6 n.7. 
 36 PLUCKNETT, supra note 27, at 528-29. 
 37 J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 257 (3d ed. 
1990). 
 38 Id. 
 39 PLUCKNETT, supra note 27, at 540. 
 40 18 Edw. 1, c. 1 (1290) (Eng.).  
 41 BAKER, supra note 37, at 298; PLUCKNETT, supra note 27, at 540. 
 42 Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 269. 
 43 If the tenant in question was a tenant in chief of the Crown, restrictions on 
inter vivos alienation remained, notwithstanding Quia emptores. See PLUCKNETT, 
supra note 27, at 542. 
 44 Strictly speaking, the Church qua Church was not a corporation capable of 
holding title to property. Instead, title might be held by “the Bishop of Ely” in his 
capacity as Bishop, or by “the Abbey of S. Albans” as such. See MAITLAND, supra note 
25, at 510. Remember, therefore, that whenever I use a phrase like “Church property,” 
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known as a conveyance in mortmain.45 An ecclesiastical tenant 
could certainly furnish a lord with hired knights on horseback, 
just as a secular tenant could, but the Church could not marry, 
have offspring, or die. Thus, a conveyance by a human tenant 
to the Church, though it did not deprive the lord of continued 
knight service,46 did deprive him of valuable future incidents of 
relief, wardship, marriage, and escheat. The feudal aristocracy 
was particularly concerned about collusive gifts of land to the 
Church, whereby a tenant could evade his feudal obligations 
and deprive the lord of the lord’s due by ostensibly granting 
lands to the Church while retaining the right to occupy and the 
right to demand a regrant of the land.47 The Great Charter of 
1217 explicitly barred such collusive transfers,48 and then, some 
sixty years later, the 1279 Statute of Mortmain (De viris 
religiosis)49 barred all alienations in mortmain—whether 
collusive or not—and the penalty for such attempted 
conveyances was declared to be forfeiture to the lord of the 
fee.50 Transfers to secular corporations were likewise 
considered alienations in mortmain and barred by the 1279 
  
I am referring to any of various properties held by particular religious officers or 
houses, rather than to assets held by an organization known as “the Church.” 
 45 See ARTHUR R. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAW 257 (1986); see also 
supra note 19. 
 46 See HOGUE, supra note 45, at 25. While “knight service” was a common 
form of tenure even for ecclesiastical officers or houses, an exceptional form of 
ecclesiastical tenure—frankalmoign—existed until it was all but abolished by the 
Statute Quia Emptores in 1290. SIMPSON, supra note 34, at 10-11.  
Sometimes religious bodies and religious persons, monasteries, bishops, 
parsons, hold land for which they do no earthly service to the lord. They are 
said to hold by way of free alms, free charity, per liberam elemosynam, in 
frankalmoign. The theory of tenure however is saved by the doctrine that 
they owe spiritual service, that they are bound to pray for the soul of the 
donor who has given them this land, and this duty can be enforced by 
spiritual censures in the ecclesiastical courts. 
MAITLAND, supra note 25, at 25. 
 47 Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endowments and the Democratization of 
Dynasty, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 873, 900 (1997). 
 48 BAKER, supra note 37, at 277; PLUCKNETT, supra note 27, at 541. 
 49 7 Edw., stat. 2, c. 13 (1279) (Eng.). 
 50 Id. The ecclesiastical grantee’s title was not void; it was merely voidable at 
the instance of the lord or of his lord. That is, termination of the grantee’s title required 
a positive act by the lord or by the King. Moreover, a license to alienate in mortmain 
could, without much difficulty, be purchased from the King, Brody, supra note 47, at 
900, and such licenses were in fact granted “lavishly.” PLUCKNETT, supra note 27,  
at 542. If an alienation in mortmain was made without the purchase of a license, but 
no lord thereafter exercised in fact his right of entry to undo the conveyance pursuant 
to the 1279 statute, the grant in mortmain was deemed to have been impliedly licensed 
through waiver of the right of entry. Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 268. 
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statute inasmuch as corporations, like ecclesiastical houses, 
never die or marry or have children.51  
Thus, the original mortmain statute was designed to 
protect the feudal aristocracy as a class,52 not to protect the 
lord’s heirs from disinheritance as individuals.53 What 
protected the lord’s heirs (or at least the lord’s eldest son) from 
disinheritance were the rules of primogeniture and the lack of 
any right of testation. But change was afoot that would soon 
expose heirs to a risk of disinheritance: the development of the 
“use.” The use may have begun its existence as a device for 
circumventing primogeniture.54 For example, if A owned land 
and wanted to transfer it at death to all his sons equally 
instead of to his eldest son only, A could convey the land inter 
vivos to B and his heirs to the use of A for life and then, upon 
A’s death, to the use of A’s sons. Such a conveyance had the 
added benefit of insulating A from the feudal incidents owed to 
A’s lord inasmuch as the incidents attached only to the 
transmission of a legal estate.55 But not only did the use permit 
circumvention of primogeniture and feudal obligations, it 
effectively permitted testation where none had been permitted 
before, since A could convey the land to the use of anyone, not 
just to the use of his sons. Indeed, a landowner could convey 
land to a feoffee during his lifetime to such uses as he might 
declare in his yet-to-be-executed will.56 Consequently, by the 
early fifteenth century, most land in England was held in use,57 
and landowners became accustomed to making the equivalent 
of testamentary transfers. Finally, in 1540, freeholders in land 
were granted the power to devise it without going through the 
rigmarole of enfeoffment to uses.58  
  
 51 See HOGUE, supra note 45, at 74. 
 52 The statute, in its opening lines, stated that it was enacted to prevent 
“services which are owed from fiefs of this sort, and which were originally established 
for the defense of the kingdom[, from being] wrongfully withheld.” See id. 
 53 Concern that land might vest perpetually in ecclesiastical organizations to 
the detriment of the state was not peculiar to England. “Already during the Roman 
Empire prohibitions were enacted by one of the first Christian emperors to prevent the 
aggrandizement of the church through the acquisition of land.” Oosterhoff, supra note 
18, at 260. 
 54 See Brody, supra note 47, at 900-01. 
 55 WILLIAM E. BURBY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 7 (3d ed. 
1965). (Of course, B was chargeable with the feudal incidents, but evidently methods 
existed for insulating B as well. Id.) 
 56 JONES, supra note 3, at 6-7. 
 57 Brody, supra note 47, at 901. 
 58 The 1540 statute was the Statute of Wills, 32 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1540) (Eng.). 
Four years earlier, as a response to the loss of feudal benefits occasioned by the 
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From the aristocracy’s point of view, the availability of 
devise aggravated the mortmain problem. Back when 
charitable transfers of land could be accomplished only inter 
vivos, a tenant’s natural desire to hold until death what was 
his could be relied upon to check what Professor Simpson called 
“excesses of piety”;59 but once charitable devises could be freely 
made, that natural desire no longer served as a check.  
Coinciding with this development was the English 
Reformation. Although King Henry VIII made extensive use of 
his rights of entry (as lord Paramount) under the Statute of 
Mortmain in his efforts to destroy religious houses and the 
power of the Roman Catholic Church in England,60 the 
protection of individual lords’ feudal incidents took on a 
diminished importance in his national policy.61 Instead, 
national policy was directed toward the encouragement of 
charitable giving: secular charitable giving.  
That legislative enactments to encourage private 
secular philanthropy came about concurrently with the English 
Reformation is a matter of historical fact.62 Different 
hypotheses exist, however, as to the reasons for the 
concurrence of these developments. Certainly there was at the 
time of the Reformation a need for schools, hospitals, and 
venues of relief for the poor and aged; and King Henry’s 
suppression of the monasteries, which had hitherto provided 
some of those services,63 could only have aggravated the need. 
Moreover, the Reformation itself, by altering people’s views of 
the nature of religion, may have altered their understanding of 
the function of philanthropy. Jones notes: 
  
employment of uses and to what were evidently informal testamentary dispositions of 
uses, Parliament had enacted the Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. 8, c. 10 (1536) (Eng.), which 
declared that henceforth the holder of the use (the cestui que use) would be treated as 
the owner of the legal estate. BURBY, supra note 55, at 9. This foreclosure by 
Parliament of the possibility of testation proved so immediately unpopular that 
Parliament enacted the Statute of Wills to undo the damage. See Jeffrey G. Sherman, 
Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory of Testamentary Restraints on 
Conjugal and Religious Choices, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273, 1285, 1298 (1999). 
 59 SIMPSON, supra note 34, at 53. 
 60 Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 271. 
 61 Indeed, Parliament abolished the feudal incidents altogether in 1645, 
during the days of the Commonwealth, and that abolition was reconfirmed at the time 
of the Restoration. Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Seventeenth-Century Revolution in the 
English Land Law, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 221, 241-42 (1995). 
 62 Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 274. 
 63 See LEONARD SHELFORD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF 
MORTMAIN, AND CHARITABLE USES AND TRUSTS 42-43 (1842). 
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The objects of charity were to become more secular as the majority of 
Englishmen reflected less on the fate of their souls and became more 
concerned with the worldly needs of their fellow men.64  
Thus, a gift to a secular corporation for the maintenance 
of a school or hospital came to appeal more to religiously-
motivated potential donors than did a gift to an ecclesiastical 
body for the saying of masses or the upkeep of a chapel. 
Funds bequeathed for charitable purposes were 
frequently misapplied by the persons charged with their 
administration, and few if any remedies were available to 
enforce the restrictions that the charitable grantors had 
originally sought to impose.65 As the need for private charitable 
endowments increased and as those endowments came to be 
more likely secular than spiritual, Parliament was moved to 
enact statutes making the enforcement of charitable “uses” 
easier to accomplish.66 Also at this time, Parliament, by various 
acts, “dispensed with” the old statutory mortmain restrictions 
applicable to land.67 Soon, property could be readily conveyed or 
devised to charitable corporations or to individuals in trust for 
any charitable use. But accompanying these liberalizing 
changes applicable to secular charitable transfers came a fierce 
determination, partly legislative and partly judicial, to ensure 
that no charitable transfers could benefit the Roman Catholic 
Church.68 
It is tempting to view this anti-Catholic agenda as 
merely another example of the sectarian bigotry we 
occasionally see today in the United States, but such a view is 
quite ahistorical. The impetus for this sixteenth century 
hostility was not sectarianism but incipient nationalism. When 
King Henry VIII, for dynastic and political reasons, determined 
to abrogate all Papal authority within England,69 Parliament in 
furtherance of that agenda enacted the so-called Act of 
Supremacy (1534), declaring “that the King, our sovereign lord, 
his heirs and successors, kings of this realm, shall be taken, 
  
 64 JONES, supra note 3, at 10. 
 65 See, e.g., id. at 10, 16. Remember, even before the English Reformation, 
personal property could be disposed of by will and in mortmain. See supra note 34. 
 66 See, e.g., Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz., c. 4 (Eng.). See 
generally JONES, supra note 3, at 16-56. 
 67 SHELFORD, supra note 63, at 42-57. 
 68 See infra text accompanying notes 72-79. 
 69 For a short discussion of the background of King Henry’s actions, see 
Jeffrey G. Sherman, A Tax Teacher Tries Law and (Dramatic) Literature, 37 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 255, 275-78 (2004). 
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accepted, and reputed the only supreme head in earth of the 
Church of England.”70 By virtue of that enactment, one could no 
longer remain simultaneously a scrupulous Catholic and a 
loyal Englishman inasmuch as any profession that the Pope’s 
ecclesiastical authority exceeded that of the King constituted 
an act not simply of religious nonconformity but of political 
treason. And the Church’s belligerent response to the schism 
only strengthened the connection in the English mind between 
Catholicism and violent subversion.71  
The principal judicial tool for preventing charitably 
inclined donors from benefiting the Catholic Church was the 
doctrine of “superstitious uses.”72 By the end of Elizabeth’s 
reign, secular charitable trusts had become actively favored by 
chancellors,73 who 
would . . . save charitable trusts despite defects in form or because of 
incapacity of the feoffees to uses even though such defects or 
incapacity would be fatal to other trusts. Moreover, statutes of 
limitation were held ineffective to bar actions to enforce charitable 
uses, a charitable use could not be destroyed by a tortious 
feoffment[,] and charitable legacies were preferred on a marshalling 
of assets.74  
Chancellors also developed the doctrine of cy pres, which 
continues to be applied even today. The trustees of a charitable 
trust lack the authority to alter the terms of the transfer 
merely because they think such an alteration would be 
desirable. However, if an intended charitable trust would 
otherwise fail because its purposes are or have become 
impossible to achieve, the doctrine of cy pres allows courts to 
  
 70 Act of Supremacy, 26 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1534) (Eng.). 
 71 In 1570 Pope Pius V issued a bull, Regnans in Excelsis, declaring the 
English monarch (Elizabeth I at the time) an excommunicate and purporting to absolve 
her subjects of their sworn duty to obey her. See Michael deHaven Newsom, The 
American Protestant Empire: A Historical Perspective, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 187, 222 
(2001). Pius’s immediate successor went on to proclaim that the assassination of 
Elizabeth would not be a mortal sin. See, e.g., CAROLLY ERICKSON, THE FIRST 
ELIZABETH 318-19 (1997). 
 72 Courts’ employment of the word “superstitious” in this context may have 
had a legislative genesis in the preamble to a 1547 statute—the Chantries Act, 1 Edw. 
6, c. 14 (1547) (Eng.)—aimed at suppressing charitable endowments for private, 
presumably Catholic, chapels. The preamble applied the words “superstition and 
errors” to such matters as the belief in Purgatory and the saying of masses on behalf of 
the dead. See JONES, supra note 3, at 12. 
 73 Obviously, the question arose then and has continued to arise as to what 
trust purposes are to be considered “charitable.” This question lies beyond the scope of 
this Article, but the interested reader is directed to WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. & 
SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 390-92 (3d ed. 2004). 
 74 Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 277. 
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authorize the trustee to apply the trust property to other, but 
similar, charitable purposes if such an alteration would not 
contravene the grantor’s intent.75 
But none of these indulgent and curative policies 
available to secular charitable trusts—including the prospect of 
perpetual duration even after the “rule against perpetuities” 
developed for private transfers76—were made available under 
English law at the time if the purposes of the trust were found 
to be “superstitious.” On the contrary, the trust was declared 
void and forfeit to the Crown,77 albeit with the hope that the 
Crown would then, as parens patriae, apply the forfeited funds 
to some lawful charitable use, rather than simply adding them 
to the royal coffers.78 Initially, “superstitious uses” meant uses 
for the support of the beliefs, institutions, or clergy of the 
Roman Catholic Church,79 but the understanding of the term 
expanded over the years to include trusts for the benefit of such 
other non-Anglican religions as Unitarianism80 and Judaism.81 
Indeed, the doctrine of “superstitious uses” continued to be 
employed to strike down trusts for the benefit of non-Anglican 
religions even after English law was changed to officially 
“tolerate” those religions,82 although an occasional court might 
“save” the superstitious trust by applying cy pres and directing 
the trustees to use the trust funds for an Anglican purpose that 
the court considered similar.83  
The doctrine of superstitious uses has survived in 
English law, but not as a tool to invalidate, on a per se basis, 
trusts for the benefit of a minority religion. Rather, the 
doctrine has survived (and is applied under American law as 
  
 75 For a historical discussion of the doctrine of cy pres, see Joseph Willard, 
Illustrations of the Origin of Cy Près, 8 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1894). 
 76 Pursuant to the rule against perpetuities, all the beneficiaries’ interests 
under a private trust must vest or fail within the period of the Rule, but a charitable 
trust may continue in perpetuity. 4A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 365 
n.1 (William Franklin Fratcher ed., 4th ed. 1989).  
 77 JONES, supra note 3, at 13. 
 78 Id. at 77. 
 79 See id. at 82-87. 
 80 Attorney-General v. Pearson, 3 Mer. 353, 353, 36 Eng. Rep. 135. 136 
(1817). 
 81 Da Costa v. De Paz, 1 Dick. 258, 258-59, 21 Eng. Rep. 268, 268 (1754). 
 82 As late as 1854, a gift for the saying of masses was held void as being 
intended for a superstitious use. Heath v. Chapman, 2 Drew. 417, 426, 61 Eng. Rep. 
781, 784-85 (1854). 
 83 See, e.g., Da Costa, 1 Dick. at 258, 21 Eng. Rep. at 268 (modifying a trust 
originally intended to support instruction in the Jewish religion to support a foundling 
hospital whose inmates were to be instructed in the Christian religion). 
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well), albeit without the pejorative word “superstitious,” as a 
useful tool for invalidating trusts that neither confer a public 
benefit84 nor support definitely identifiable individuals.85 In the 
1923 English Chancery case of In re Hummeltenberg,86 the 
testator had bequeathed a substantial sum in trust for the 
purpose of “training and developing suitable persons, male and 
female, as mediums.” The trust was a perpetuity and therefore 
had to be declared invalid unless it was found to be charitable;87 
and to be classified as charitable, a trust must be designed to 
confer some sort of significant public benefit.88 The court, after 
expressing its understanding that a medium is “an individual 
who professes to act as an intermediate for communication 
between the living and the spirits of persons now dead,” held 
that the training of mediums did not confer a public benefit and 
that the trust was therefore invalid.89 While the court did not 
go so far as to call mediums frauds or to call spiritualism 
superstition,90 it did liken the testator’s intention to “the 
  
 84 See Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539 (1867). To be considered 
charitable, a trust must benefit 
an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts 
under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from 
disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves in 
life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works or otherwise 
lessening the burdens of government. 
Id. at 556; accord GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF 
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 369 (rev. 2d ed. 1991). 
 85 A private trust, unlike a charitable trust, must have definitely identifiable 
individual beneficiaries to be valid. If no individual beneficiaries can be identified, then 
no one has standing to enforce the trust; and if no one has standing to enforce the 
trust, then the putative trustee is not bound by any fiduciary constraints. And if the 
putative trustee is not bound by any fiduciary constraints, she is not a trustee and 
therefore no trust exists. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 518-
19 (7th ed. 2005). In the case of a charitable trust, however, the state attorney-general, 
or some other designated public official, has standing to enforce the trust, so 
identifiable individual beneficiaries are unnecessary. MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 
73, at 389. 
 86 [1923] 1 Ch. 237, All Eng. Rep. 49. 
 87 See supra note 76. 
 88 See supra note 84. 
 89 In re Hummeltenberg, [1923] 1 Ch. at 242, All Eng. Rep. at 51. 
 90 The Supreme Court of Michigan invalidated a will that bequeathed the 
bulk of the testator’s estate “to be used as a nucleus in founding, building and 
equipping a home for poor and aged mediums.” O’Dell v. Goff, 112 N.W. 736, 737 (Mich. 
1907). Such a bequest does not raise quite the same public policy issues as the will in 
Hummeltenberg did, inasmuch as the O’Dell bequest was intended to benefit the 
needy—a valid charitable aim—rather than to advance a particular doctrine. But there 
was considerable evidence in O’Dell that the testator believed that his will was dictated 
to him by spirits, and the court invalidated the entire will not on public policy grounds 
but on the grounds of testamentary incapacity and undue influence. Id. 
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promoting of all kinds of fantastic (though not unlawful) objects 
of which the training of poodles to dance might be a mild 
example;”91 and it hinted that, had the perpetuities objection 
not been dispositive, it would have been at least open to the 
argument that the trust was invalid on public policy grounds.92  
How have English courts responded in modern times to 
the kinds of trusts at which the anti-Catholic Tudor policies 
were specially aimed: trusts to support the saying of masses for 
the repose of souls? Courts continued to apply the 
“superstitious uses” doctrine to invalidate such trusts until 
1919,93 when the House of Lords overruled these longstanding 
precedents and held that trusts for the saying of masses were 
not “superstitious” and therefore could be valid trusts.94 There 
still remained, however, the requirement that charitable trusts 
provide a public benefit. As to this, courts held that trusts to 
support the saying of masses were valid if the public (or a 
significant portion of the public) had access to the masses95 but 
invalid if the public was excluded.96 As to public masses, courts 
were willing to give religious beliefs—even “minority” religious 
beliefs—more allowance than they were willing to give belief in 
mediums: 
A religion can be regarded as beneficial without it being necessary to 
assume that all its beliefs are true, and a religious service can be 
regarded as beneficial to all those who attend it without it being 
necessary to determine the spiritual efficacy of that service or to 
accept any particular belief about it.97  
But as to private masses, the public benefits postulated 
to accrue from them—the beneficial public effects of 
intercessory prayer and the edification of the public by 
example—were held to be, respectively, incapable of proof and 
  
 91 In re Hummeltenberg, [1923] 1 Ch. at 242, All Eng. Rep. at 51. 
 92 If the perpetuities issue had not been dispositive (because, let us say, the 
duration of the trust was expressly limited to twenty-one years), the court’s finding 
that the trust was not charitable might still have supported a holding that the trust 
was invalid if the trust did not have definitely identifiable beneficiaries. See supra note 
85. For some reason, however, the court does not discuss this alternative rationale; it 
mentions only public policy as an alternative rationale. 
 93 For examples of cases applying the “superstitious uses” doctrine as late as 
the nineteenth century, see Heath v. Chapman, [1854] 2 Drew. 417; West v. 
Shuttleworth, [1835] 2 Myl. & K. 684. 
 94 Bourne v. Keane, [1919] A.C. 815, 926. 
 95 In re Hetherington, [1990] Ch. 1, 13 (1989). 
 96 Gilmour v. Coats, [1949] A.C. 426, 442-55 (H.L.). 
 97 Id. at 459. 
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too intangible.98 That these invalidated trusts for private 
masses bear some resemblance to the private chantries 
condemned and invalidated as superstitious by the Chantries 
Act of 1547 is interesting but not cause for disquiet.99 The 
modern English courts’ distinction between publicly accessible 
and private religious observance is neutral as to religious 
content and treats religious belief no differently from any other 
belief that is unsusceptible of proof,100 while the sixteenth 
century statute was—by its design and in its effect—entirely 
sectarian. 
B. Later English Mortmain Law: A Private Law Response 
The early English mortmain law, just discussed, dealt 
with a public law problem: the erosion of the feudal 
aristocracy’s privileges. But this Article is concerned with a 
private law problem that has outlasted feudalism: individual 
testators who allow charitable inclinations to outweigh 
supposed obligations to the natural objects of their bounty. 
Both post-feudal English legislators and their American 
counterparts responded to this private law concern by enacting 
statutes  
to prevent undue influence and imposition upon pious and feeble 
minds in their last moments, and to check that unhappy propensity, 
which sometimes is found to exist under a bigotted enthusiasm, and 
the desire to gain fame as a religious devotee and benefactor, at the 
expense of all the natural claims of blood and parental duty to 
children.101  
  
 98 See Giles v. McDonnell, [1989] Ch. 133 Sol. J. 457. 
 99 See supra note 72. 
 100 Unique among American jurisdictions, the District of Columbia had a 
mortmain statute that imposed restrictions on bequests to clergy or religious 
institutions like churches but not on bequests to charitable, educational, or artistic 
institutions, even those operated by religious institutions. See Estate of French v. 
Doyle, 365 A.2d 621, 622 (D.C. 1976). Thus, a bequest to a semi-cloistered order of nuns 
was held invalid, McInerney v. District of Columbia, 355 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1965), 
while a bequest to the Little Sisters of the Poor was held valid. In re Estate of Susan 
Evelyn Murray, No. 29831 (D.C. Dec. 26, 1924) (cited in Estate of French, 365 A.2d at 
622). The District of Columbia statute was later held unconstitutional. Estate of 
French, 365 A.2d at 625. See infra text accompanying notes 174-176. 
 101 This passage comes from an anonymous “Note I” printed as an appendix to 
Philadelphia Baptist Ass’n v. Hart’s Executors, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1 (1819) [hereinafter 
Note I, Phila. Baptist Ass’n]. This appendix is published (and separately paginated) at 
the end of Volume 17 of United States Reports; the quoted passage appears on page 23 
of this appendix. Professor Brody identifies Mr. Justice Story as the author of this 
anonymous Note. See Brody, supra note 47, at 907. 
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In 1736, long after the medieval mortmain restrictions 
were “dispensed with,”102 the English Parliament enacted what 
we know as the Modern Law of Mortmain.103 It was enacted at a 
time of rampant anti-clericalism in England, a time when 
many “feared that the clergy would emulate what they thought 
to be the example of their medieval predecessors and terrorise 
them into making death-bed devises” to religious causes.104 But 
the statute continued in operation long after this wave of anti-
clericalism faded, for the logic and function of the statute was 
neither to prevent increases in the Church’s wealth nor to curb 
testators’ attempts at gratifying their vanity through pious 
acts. Rather, the statute was designed to “strike down the 
death-bed charitable devise which deprived the heir of land 
deemed to be his natural right.”105 Among other things, the Act 
prohibited the conveyance of lands (or the conveyance of 
personalty to be applied to the purchase of lands) for charitable 
uses unless  
[a] the conveyance [was] by deed signed, sealed, and delivered in the 
presence of two or more witnesses at least twelve months before the 
death of the donor or grantor; [b] the deed [was] enrolled in the high 
Court of Chancery within six months after its execution; [c] in the 
case of the transfer of stocks to be laid out in the purchase of lands, 
such stocks [were] transferred in the [corporate] books kept for that 
purpose six months before the death of the donor or grantor; and [d] 
the conveyance [was to] take effect in possession forthwith on its 
making . . ., without power of revocation . . . .106  
Observe that, inasmuch as no devise could possibly 
satisfy these conditions, the effect of the statute was to bar 
devises of land to charity.107 But this bar operated quite 
differently from the medieval and Tudor mortmain restrictions. 
Under the earlier mortmain rules, an improper devise to 
charity was not void but merely voidable;108 only if the lord or 
the King exercised his right of entry would the land be 
forfeited.109 The 1736 statute, on the other hand, rendered such 
  
 102 See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text. 
 103 Mortmain Act, 9 Geo. 2, c. 36 (1736). 
 104 JONES, supra note 3, at 109. 
 105 Id. at 117-18; see Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 281. 
 106 Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 284. 
 107 And the fourth restriction effectively barred inter vivos conveyances of 
remainders to charity. Inter vivos transfers had to be outright and immediate. 
 108 See supra note 50. 
 109 See Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 278, 288. 
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devises void absolutely.110 Furthermore, the 1736 statute—like 
all American mortmain statutes that came after it—
contemplated that such improperly devised land would pass to 
the testator’s heirs (or residuary devisees) rather than 
escheating to the public fisc.111  
Several comparative observations may usefully be made 
at this point. First, in the decades between the 1601 enactment 
of the Statute of Charitable Uses and the 1736 enactment of 
the Mortmain Act, English courts came to favor charitable 
devises and were inclined to take an expansive view as to what 
transfers qualified as “charitable” so that such transfers would 
enjoy the special protections afforded charitable donations.112 In 
contrast, after the 1736 Act, taking an expansive view of what 
constituted “charity” endangered more transfers by bringing 
them within the invalidating reach of the statute;113 and the 
same possibility of endangerment existed under the American 
mortmain statutes that we shall discuss shortly. Second, the 
1736 Act dealt only with transfers of land, not transfers of 
personalty: an arbitrary distinction (since the feudal incidents 
had been abolished114) that allowed a charitably inclined 
testator to frustrate Parliament and disappoint his heirs by 
converting all his land to personalty before executing his will. 
On the other hand, few American mortmain statutes treated 
land differently from personalty.115 Third, while the 1736 Act 
invalidated all testamentary transfers of land to charity, it 
invalidated inter vivos transfers of land only if they were made 
less than one year before the transferor’s death.116 Parliament 
seems to have assumed that a landowner was unlikely to make 
improvident land-transfers that stood to jeopardize his 
standard of living. Since testamentary transfers do not reduce 
a transferor’s wealth, all testamentary transfers came within 
  
 110 Id. at 284. 
 111 See JONES, supra note 3, at 113-19. For example, suppose a testator in her 
will devised Blackacre to Charity A, £10,000 to Charity B without restrictions, and the 
residue of her estate to individual C. Upon application of the 1736 rule, Blackacre 
would become part of the residue and pass to C; it would not escheat to the Crown. 
 112 See Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 277. 
 113 See JONES, supra note 3, at 107-08. 
 114 See supra note 61. 
 115 Even today, some American jurisdictions restrict the amount of land that 
may be held by the trustees of a charitable or benevolent association. See, e.g., VA. 
CODE ANN. § 57-20 (2006) (five acres); see also MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-11-33 (2006) 
(effectively prohibiting religious societies from owning land other than that reasonably 
related to certain enumerated institutional purposes). 
 116 See Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 284. 
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the reach of the statute. But since inter vivos transfers do 
reduce a transferor’s wealth, no special restrictions were 
needed unless the landowner was so close to death that his self-
interest could not be relied upon as a check on his 
improvidence. American mortmain statutes, on the other hand, 
rarely applied to inter vivos transfers at all. 
C. American Mortmain Law—A Similar Private Law 
Response 
The 1736 English Mortmain Law never had any force in 
the American colonies.117 But American judges and legislators 
undoubtedly knew of the 1736 Law, and after the founding of 
our republic many of them thought the English example 
worthy of emulation. Justice Story, for instance, urged 
American legislators to follow the “enlightened” example of the 
English Parliament by enacting legislation to prevent the 
“imposition upon pious and feeble minds in their last moments” 
and to restrain charitable impulses when they threaten “the 
natural claims of blood and parental duty to children.”118 For 
without such legislation, American courts often had to watch 
helplessly as charitable bequests shattered family members’ 
expectations. 
In Doughten v. Vandever, for example, a testator had 
left almost her entire estate to a number of charities and 
almost nothing to her blood relatives.119 Although the will 
described the intended charitable legatees in vague and 
inaccurate language, the court upheld the bequests 
nonetheless, a result quite consistent with the traditional 
judicial favoritism shown to attempted charitable transfers.120 
But the court expressed its disapproval of the testator’s 
intention to leave all to charity at the expense of her family. 
The court stated: 
There is nothing in the will . . ., with respect to these charitable 
bequests, at the expense of her relatives in blood, that meets the 
approval of my judgment. Her example in this respect I would not 
commend as worthy of imitation; and nothing but a sense of duty, 
which compels me to follow the law as expounded by courts of equity, 
has caused me to give an interpretation to the provisions of her 
  
 117 Brody, supra note 47, at 906; Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 297 (citing 
Attorney-Gen. v. Stewart, (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 895, 900-01). 
 118 See supra note 101. 
 119 Doughten v. Vandever, 5 Del. Ch. 51, 51-52 (1875). 
 120 See supra note 3; supra text accompanying notes 62-74. 
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will . . . by which her heirs at law are excluded from the benefit of 
sharing her estate.121  
Consequently, American legislators, some at least as 
early as 1848, began to take Justice Story’s advice.122 For 
example, the Supreme Court of California, writing in 1907, 
explained the purpose of that state’s mortmain statute: 
It is that a man’s fears or superstition, or his death-bed hope of 
purchasing a blissful immortality, shall not be allowed to influence 
the disposition which he may thus make of his property, to the injury 
of his heirs.123  
American mortmain statutes, all of them since 
repealed,124 generally fell within one of two categories:  
(1) statutes that limited the percentage of a testator’s estate 
that she was permitted to bequeath to charity (we shall use the 
term “percentage restrictions” to refer to this first group);  
and, more commonly, (2) statutes that annulled charitable 
bequests if the testator died only a short time after executing 
the will (we shall use the term “deathbed restrictions” to  
refer to the second).125 Among the percentage restrictions were 
Iowa’s (invalid in excess of twenty-five percent)126 and New 
York’s (invalid in excess of fifty percent).127 Among the 
deathbed restrictions were California’s (30 days),128 Florida’s  
(6 months),129 and Idaho’s (120 days).130 And a few statutes—
  
 121 Doughten, 5 Del. Ch. at 77. 
 122 See Shirley Norwood Jones, The Demise of Mortmain in the United States, 
12 MISS. C. L. REV. 407, 409 (1992). 
 123 In re Lennon’s Estate, 92 P. 870, 871 (Cal. 1907). 
 124 In 1970, eleven American jurisdictions still had mortmain statutes: 
California, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Mississippi, Montana, 
New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. All of them have since been repealed or held 
unconstitutional. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 9.7 cmt. c, note 3 (2003). 
 125 Strictly speaking, these American statutes were not mortmain statutes, 
inasmuch as they did not purport to limit the amount of wealth that a charitable body 
might accumulate. See Kramer v. Eckart (In re Estate of Eckart), 348 N.E.2d 905, 909 
(N.Y. 1976). Nonetheless, it is common to use the word “mortmain” in the context of 
these statutes, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 9.7 cmt. (2003); Michael G. Walsh, Annotation, Modern Status, Validity, 
and Effect of Mortmain Statutes, 6 A.L.R.4th 603 § 2(a) (1981), and I shall continue to 
do so in this Article. 
 126 IOWA PROB. CODE § 633.266 (repealed 1980). 
 127 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-3.3 (repealed 1981). 
 128 CAL. PROB. CODE § 41 (repealed 1971). 
 129 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.803, invalidated by Shriners’ Hosp. for Crippled 
Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 68-69 (Fla. 1990). 
 130 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-615 (repealed 1994). 
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such as Ohio’s—combined the features of both groups (invalid 
in excess of twenty-five percent if the testator died less than six 
months after executing the will).131 The ostensible targets of the 
percentage restrictions were “excesses of piety,”132 while those 
of the deathbed restrictions were bequests generated by “the 
[deathbed] fears of the faithful.”133 Both kinds of restrictions did 
succeed in reaching their targets, but not without difficulties 
that made enforcement inconsistent and problematic. 
For example, did the statutes render the offending 
charitable bequest absolutely void or merely voidable if 
challenged by someone with standing to do so? Under the 1736 
English statute that served as a model for American 
legislation,134 such bequests were void.135 Under the American 
statutes, however, such bequests generally were held merely to 
be voidable. The Iowa mortmain statute, for instance, provided: 
No devise or bequest to a [not-for-profit corporation] shall be valid in 
excess of one-fourth of the testator’s estate after the payment of 
debts, if a spouse, child, child of a deceased child, or parent survive 
the testator.136  
Read literally, this statute provides that if a specified relative 
survives the testator, the excess bequest is automatically void, 
even if none of those relatives actually files an objection. 
  
 131 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.06 (repealed 1985). In addition to 
invalidating all charitable bequests made within thirty days of death, the California 
statute invalidated even charitable bequests made more than thirty days before death 
to the extent that such earlier bequests exceeded one-third of the estate. CAL. PROB. 
CODE § 41 (repealed by 1971 Cal. Stat. ch. 1395).  
 132 See supra note 59. 
 133 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of Florida 
stated that Florida’s mortmain statute was “obviously [designed] to prevent testators 
who may be laboring under the apprehension of impending death from disposing of 
their estates to the exclusion of those who are, or should be, the natural objects of the 
testator’s bounty.” Taylor v. Payne, 17 So. 2d 615, 618 (Fla. 1944), overruled by 
Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 70 (Fla. 1990). 
 134 The case of universities provides an interesting illustration of the extent to 
which American legislators were indebted to their English progenitors. When the 1736 
English statute was being debated, Parliament granted exemptions for transfers made 
to the universities and colleges at Oxford and Cambridge and to the schools of Eton, 
Westminster, and Winchester, since Parliament considered these institutions to be the 
only public foundations “either useful or necessary in this Kingdom.” JONES, supra note 
3, at 111. Florida legislators included a similar exemption in their state’s mortmain 
statute, which by its terms did not apply to “devises or bequests made to institutions of 
higher learning.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.19; see also CAL. PROB. CODE § 42 (repealed 
1971). (The California repealing legislation exempts certain public and private 
educational institutions from the restrictions of the state’s mortmain statute. 1971 Cal. 
Stat. ch. 1395 § 1.) 
 135 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 136 IOWA PROB. CODE § 633.266 (repealed 1980). 
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Nonetheless, the Iowa courts construed the statute to make the 
charitable bequest merely voidable, at the instance of one or 
more of the specified relatives.137 California courts—noting the 
public policy “in favor of charities and against the concept of 
mortmain”—reached a similar result under the California 
statute.138 And the Florida mortmain statute quite explicitly 
stated that a charitable bequest could be avoided only if one or 
more of the lineal descendants or a spouse who would receive 
any interest in the devise, if avoided, “file[d] written notice to 
this effect in the administration proceeding within 4 months 
after the date letters [testamentary were] issued.”139 The 
mortmain statutes of a few states, however, contained no 
references to enumerated relatives, and accordingly those 
statutes were held to render the offending bequests void 
absolutely inasmuch as courts saw no textual basis for tying 
invalidity to the claims of particular persons.140  
D. Why Mortmain Statutes Proved Unworkable 
Even in the majority of states whose mortmain statutes 
were dependent on challenges brought by enumerated 
relatives, some courts required not only that the challenger be 
one of the enumerated relatives but also that she be entitled to 
take an additional share of property in the event the challenge 
was successful. In other words, an objectant’s standing 
depended not simply on being one of the enumerated relatives 
but also on enjoying the prospect of benefiting from the 
objection. For example, suppose a state’s mortmain statute was 
interpreted to require that an objection be filed by a spouse or 
descendant before a charitable bequest might be successfully 
challenged. A testator’s will provided, “I bequeath $100,000 to 
Charity X and the residue of my estate to my niece.” The 
testator, who was also survived by a son, died less than a 
month after executing the will, so the charitable bequest was 
voidable under the mortmain statute. But even if the 
  
 137 See Watson v. Manley, 130 N.W.2d 693, 696-97 (Iowa 1964), and the cases 
cited therein. 
 138 McCormack v. Catholic Church Extension Soc’y of the United States of Am. 
(In re Estate of Reardon), 52 Cal. Rptr. 68, 73 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Villa v. Gutierrez 
(In re Estate of Gutierrez), 33 Cal. Rptr. 593, 598 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963). 
 139 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.803, invalidated by Shriners’ Hosp. for Crippled 
Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 68-69 (Fla. 1990). 
 140 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 15-2-615 (repealed 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-
11-334 (declared unconstitutional in In re Estate of Kinyon, 615 P.2d 174 (Mont. 1980)). 
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charitable bequest were successfully challenged, the challenge 
would profit the son nothing inasmuch as the $100,000 would 
drop into residue for the niece’s benefit, rather than passing by 
intestacy to the son. The niece would benefit from a successful 
challenge, but she lacked standing to bring one inasmuch as 
she was not an enumerated relative. Consequently, the 
deathbed charitable bequest could not be reached under this 
hypothetical statute.141  
A testator might use a substitutionary gift as a device 
for thwarting such a mortmain statute: for example, “I 
bequeath $100,000 to Charity X, but if this bequest should for 
any reason be declared invalid, then I bequeath that $100,000 
to Individual A. And I bequeath the residue of my estate to my 
son.” Even though the son would ordinarily have standing to 
maintain an action to avoid the charitable bequest under this 
hypothetical mortmain statute inasmuch as he was both an 
enumerated relative and a residuary legatee, in this case he 
would lack standing inasmuch as a successful challenge to 
Charity X’s bequest would not benefit the son but only 
Individual A. Consequently, the charitable bequest would 
survive any attack brought pursuant to this mortmain 
statute.142 The Iowa rule, by contrast, did not deprive an 
enumerated relative of standing even though she would not 
derive any pecuniary benefit from a successful objection,143 and 
thus the charity would indeed lose, but Individual A, rather 
than the objecting son, would gain. And if the testator carefully 
chose Individual A, who was in fact a director or officer of 
Charity X, even the successful contest under the Iowa 
mortmain statute would not thwart the testator’s charitable 
intentions inasmuch as Individual A would be expected to use 
his inheritance to benefit the same charity that the testator 
wanted to benefit.144  
  
 141 See Whelpley v. Union Trust Bank of St. Petersburg (In re Estate of Lane), 
186 So. 2d 257, 260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966). 
 142 See, e.g., Syster v. Roman Catholic Bishop of San Diego (In re Estate of 
Sanderson), 375 P.2d 37, 40 (Cal. 1962); Rauf v. Salvation Army at Ocala (In re Estate 
of Rauf), 213 So. 2d 31, 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Cent. Nat’l Bank of Cleveland v. 
Morris, 222 N.E.2d 674 (Ohio Prob. Ct.), aff’d, 227 N.E.2d 418 (Ohio Ct. App. 1967). 
 143 See, e.g., Davis v. Davis (In re Estate of Davis), 114 N.W.2d 314, 317 (Iowa 
1962). 
 144 The device of naming a charity’s officer as a substitute taker worked 
splendidly to protect the charitable bequest in an Iowa-type jurisdiction, as long as the 
gift over was to Individual A in his individual capacity so that the will did not purport 
to impose on Individual A any legal obligation to use the inheritance to benefit the 
charity. See, e.g., Durkee v. Smith, 156 N.Y.S. 920, 922-23 (App. Div.), aff’d, 114 N.E. 
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The availability of the substitutionary gift technique 
provided testators with “a ready instrument” for protecting 
charitable bequests from successful challenges pursuant to a 
mortmain statute by depriving potential contestants of 
standing.145 It is difficult to believe that courts’ allowance of this 
technique was consistent with legislatures’ intent, especially 
where the substitute takers were officers of the charitable 
legatee. To the extent legislatures wanted to restrain bequests 
generated by the deathbed fears of the faithful, they could 
hardly have approved of this technique when the inclusion of 
the substitutionary gift might have been prompted by the same 
undue influence or the same deathbed fears that prompted the 
charitable bequest. Nonetheless, the availability of this 
technique—the ease with which a mortmain statute could be 
  
1066 (N.Y. 1916). I have some doubts as to the soundness of citing this (or any) New 
York case as an illustration of the Iowa rule, for the New York decisions puzzle me. The 
result in the Durkee case is explainable only if New York followed the Iowa rule, 
inasmuch as the challenger was able to get a charitable bequest struck down even 
though substitute takers, not the challenger himself, benefited from the successful 
challenge. Yet a later case, In re Estate of Fitzgerald, 339 N.Y.S.2d 333, 337 (Sur. Ct. 
1972), held that a substitutionary gift deprived an enumerated relative of his standing 
to contest a charitable gift; curiously, the Fitzgerald court cited the Durkee case in 
support of that proposition, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 337, even though Durkee seems to have 
held that such a relative did have standing. However, another New York case, In re 
Logasa’s Estate, appears to disagree with Fitzgerald and agree with Durkee. 297 N.Y.S. 
730, 731-32 (Sur. Ct. 1937). While the Logasa opinion is not so clear as it might be with 
regard to the facts, the case appears to have held that an enumerated relative could 
bring a challenge under the mortmain statute even though he would not benefit from 
the redirected money. Id.  
  The Iowa rule—granting standing to a petitioner who does not stand to 
benefit from a successful mortmain challenge—is inconsistent with over a century of 
wills law. In order to have standing to contest a will, an action quite analogous to 
challenging a charitable bequest pursuant to a mortmain statute, the contestant must 
show that a successful contest would increase the share of the decedent’s property that 
would devolve to her. If the invalidation of the will would not be of direct pecuniary 
benefit to her, she lacks standing to contest. See, e.g., Parker ex rel. Ames v. Reeves, 
553 So. 2d 570, 572 (Ala. 1989); Fuqua v. Holt (In re Eskridge’s Estate), 125 P.2d 527, 
528 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942); In re Shephard’s Estate, 32 A. 1040, 1042 (Pa. 1895). 
 145 Note, Standing to Contest Wills Violating Charitable Bequest Statutes, 50 
COLUM. L. REV. 94, 96 (1950). Indeed, the courts of at least one state consistently held 
that a testator bent on circumventing the statute need not have named a substitute 
taker; all she had to do was declare in the will that the relatives enumerated in the 
statute should receive no portion of her estate either by will or by intestacy. See In re 
Kramer v. Eckart (In re Estate of Eckart), 348 N.E.2d 905, 909-10 (N.Y. 1976). It 
should be noted, however, that some states, regardless of the existence of any 
mortmain statutes, do not permit a testator to disinherit her heirs simply by fiat; they 
require a testator bent on such disinheritance to make an effective bequest of her 
estate to other persons. See, e.g., Cook v. Estate of Seeman, 858 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Ark. 
1993); Clark v. Baxter (In re Estate of Baxter), 827 P.2d 184, 186 (Okla. Civ. App. 
1992). 
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circumvented—lay behind at least one legislature’s decision to 
repeal that state’s mortmain statute.146  
Mortmain statutes in the form of percentage restrictions 
frequently presented valuation and calculation issues. How, for 
example, should one value the bequest of a future interest to a 
charity? Suppose a hypothetical mortmain statute bars 
charitable bequests in excess of one-third of a testator’s net 
probate estate. A particular testator with a net probate estate 
of $300,000 bequeaths $101,000 in trust and the residue to her 
children outright. The terms of the trust provide that the 
income from the trust property is to be paid to Individual X for 
ten years, and then the remainder in the trust is to be 
distributed outright to Charity Y. At least one court held that 
since it could not determine as of the testator’s death the 
amount that would ultimately pass to Charity Y, it had to wait 
until the trust terminated to see how much actually ended up 
going to the charity.147 So, under such an interpretation, if the 
principal of our hypothetical trust remains at $101,000 until 
final distribution, the charitable bequest will be found 
retroactively to have violated the mortmain statute. Not only is 
this valuation method administratively unsatisfactory 
inasmuch as it requires the beneficiaries to wait many years 
before they know who inherits what, the method is also 
doctrinally wrong. While it is certainly true that $101,000 is 
more than one-third of the $300,000 over which the testator 
had testamentary control, the testator did not bequeath the 
entire $101,000 to charity. She bequeathed only a remainder 
  
 146 Margaret Valentine Turano, Practice Commentaries, in MCKINNEY’S 
CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK; see N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-3.3 
(repealed 1981). I find it interesting that the New York legislature regarded the 
substitutionary gift as a sure-fire method of undermining the mortmain statute, 
inasmuch as at least two New York cases—Durkee and Logasa—held that a 
substitutionary gift to a nonrelative does not deprive an enumerated relative of 
standing to object to the charitable bequest. See supra note 144. Perhaps the 
legislature had only the more recent Fitzgerald case in mind. See In re Estate of 
Fitzgerald, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 337. Or perhaps the legislature believed that most 
enumerated relatives, even if they had standing to object, would not spend the time or 
money necessary to press their objection when any success would enrich the substitute 
taker rather than themselves. In Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 
the Florida Supreme Court, in an opinion declaring Florida’s mortmain statute 
unconstitutional, noted the ease with which the statute could be circumvented through 
the use of substitutionary gifts. 563 So. 2d 64, 69 (Fla. 1990). 
 147 See McCormack v. Catholic Church Extension Soc’y of the United States of 
Am. (In re Estate of Reardon), 52 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966). This valuation 
method was employed by the trial court as reported in the appellate court’s opinion. Id. 
at 70-71. The appellate court reversed the trial court on grounds unrelated to this 
valuation issue. Id. at 76. 
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interest in that $101,000; the income from the $101,000 for ten 
years was bequeathed to an individual. If we assume an 
interest rate of 5 percent and employ standard actuarial 
valuation techniques, the present value of X’s income interest 
in that $101,000 is about $39,000, and the present value of the 
charitable bequest is about $62,000: well within the one-third 
limit.148  
Even if a court is willing to use actuarial valuation 
techniques,149 carrying out the statute may require considerable 
ingenuity. Suppose, in our previous example, the testator had 
bequeathed $200,000 to the trust instead of $101,000. The 
present value of the charitable remainder would be about 
$123,000: clearly in excess of one-third of the estate. If we 
reduced the amount of the bequest in trust to $163,000, that 
would lower the value of the charitable remainder to $100,000, 
which satisfies the mortmain statute. But lowering the trust 
corpus to $163,000 (that is, removing $37,000 from the 
$200,000 pecuniary bequest and adding that $37,000 to 
residue) would reduce more than just the charitable bequest. It 
would reduce X’s income interest as well, and X is an 
individual, not a charity. Perhaps the soundest solution would 
be to divide the $200,000 pecuniary bequest into two trusts: 
one in the amount of $163,000, with the income going to X for 
ten years and the remainder going to Charity Y; and another in 
the amount of $37,000, with the income going to X for ten years 
and the remainder going to testator’s children (the residuary 
legatees). 
Mortmain statutes in the form of percentage restrictions 
also presented interpretive problems whenever the testator 
owned property in more than one state. Under the customary 
principles of conflict of laws, the law of the situs determines the 
effectiveness of an attempted devise of land.150 For example, 
  
 148 Sometimes actuarial valuation techniques cannot be used to calculate a 
remainder’s present value, as where the trustee is authorized in its discretion to make 
corpus distributions to the life income beneficiary. See Herrington v. Nation Found. for 
Infantile Paralysis (In re Estate of Nicely), 44 Cal. Rptr. 804, 807 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1965). 
 149 See, e.g., Upole v. Roberts (In re Estate of Roberts), 437 N.E.2d 1205, 1208 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1980). 
 150 See In re Gracey’s Estate, 253 P. 921, 924 (Cal. 1927); Biederman v. 
Guzman Ramos ex rel. Estate of Barteau (In re Estate of Barteau), 736 So. 2d 57, 58 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Hyman v. Glover (In re Estate of Hannan), 523 N.W.2d 672, 
674 (Neb. 1994). Devolution of personal property is governed by the law of the 
decedent’s domicile at death. Hemingway v. McGehee (In re Estate of Chrichton), 228 
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where a Missouri domiciliary owned land located in Illinois, the 
land was held to pass by intestacy even though he left a will 
that was valid in Missouri, because an Illinois statute treated 
the will as having been revoked by the testator’s subsequent 
marriage.151 Consequently, if State One has a deathbed 
restriction mortmain statute while State Two has none, and if 
a testator domiciled in State One makes a deathbed charitable 
devise of land located in State Two, the devise will not be 
voidable under State One’s mortmain statute. And similarly, if 
a testator domiciled in State Two makes a deathbed charitable 
devise of land located in State One, the devise will be voidable 
under State One’s mortmain statute. But suppose State One’s 
mortmain statute is a percentage restriction; will the State 
Two land be taken into account for purposes of determining 
whether State One’s percentage restriction has been exceeded? 
New York law, to take one example, answered that last 
question affirmatively. First, said the Court of Appeals, the 
value of all the testator’s property, wherever located, must be 
ascertained.152 Then the value of all property not subject to New 
York law (that is, out-of-state real property and, in the case of a 
nondomiciliary, all personal property153) but bequeathed to 
charity must be ascertained.154 If that second total equals or 
exceeds fifty percent of the first total, any charitable bequests 
of property subject to New York law (that is, New York realty 
and, in the case of a New York domiciliary, all personal 
property) are voidable under New York’s mortmain statute.155 
But if that second total is less than fifty percent of the first 
total, so much property subject to New York law may pass to 
charities as will bring the total passing to charity up to fifty 
percent of the first total.156 Thus, if a New York domiciliary’s 
estate consisted of $60,000 of New York real estate, $40,000 of 
New Jersey real estate, and $50,000 of personalty, and if the 
testator’s will devised all his land to charity, New York courts 
would allow not more than $35,000 of the New York realty to 
  
N.E.2d 799, 806, 808, 823 (N.Y. 1967); Howard v. Reynolds, 283 N.E.2d 629, 630-31 
(Ohio 1972). 
 151 Sternberg v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 68 N.E.2d 892, 894, 897-98 (Ill. 
1946). Illinois law no longer provides that a testator’s marriage revokes his premarital 
wills. See ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/4-7(b) (2007). 
 152 Decker v. Vreeland, 115 N.E. 989, 992 (N.Y. 1917). 
 153 See supra note 150. 
 154 Decker, 115 N.E. at 992. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
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pass to charity free of New York’s mortmain statute.157 But this 
result assumes that no New Jersey mortmain statute would 
limit the effectiveness of the charitable devise of the New 
Jersey land. If both states had a percentage mortmain 
restriction, the process would be more complex still. 
Mortmain statutes in the form of deathbed restrictions 
presented fewer interpretive problems than mortmain statutes 
in the form of percentage restrictions. The one persistent 
problem common to the former but not to the latter was 
deathbed wills that reaffirmed charitable bequests made before 
the deathbed period began. Suppose a state’s mortmain statute 
voids all charitable bequests made within six months of death. 
Two years before her death, a testator executes Will #1, which 
bequeaths $10,000 to Charity A and the residue to individual 
X. One month before her death, the testator executes Will #2, 
which (1) expressly revokes Will #1, (2) bequeaths $10,000 to 
Charity A, and (3) bequeaths the residue to individual Y. Since 
the purpose of deathbed restrictions is “to protect . . . against 
the influences . . . [of the] last moments” that prompt a testator 
to make charitable bequests “as a means of tranquilizing a 
disturbed conscience,”158 one might argue that the statute ought 
not to be applied in this case inasmuch as the charitable 
bequest predates those “last moments.” Indeed, if the statute 
did apply in these circumstances, testators in their last 
illnesses might thereafter refrain from making needed changes 
in the noncharitable portions of their wills lest charitable 
bequests in prior wills lose their “grandfathered” status. On the 
other hand, the testator in our example might have intended, 
when she drew Will #2, to revoke the charitable bequest 
altogether and was dissuaded from doing so only by those 
“influences of the last moments.” Under this new assumption, 
one would think that the statute ought to be applied. 
And the case I have presented so far is relatively  
easy. Suppose we hold in this case that the $10,000 bequest to 
Charity A is indeed “grandfathered” under the mortmain 
statute and therefore valid. Would a $15,000 bequest to 
Charity A in Will #2 be similarly grandfathered? Grand-
fathered only to the extent of $10,000? And what about a 
bequest of $10,000 to Charity B in Will #2 to replace the 
  
 157 The total value of the testator’s estate is $150,000, so fifty percent of that 
amount equals $75,000. Since the $40,000 of New Jersey realty is effectively devised to 
charity, not more than $35,000 of New York property may be so devised. 
 158 Stephenson v. Short, 92 N.Y. 433, 444-45 (1883). 
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bequest to Charity A? Most mortmain statutes were silent on 
these points. The mortmain statutes of at least two states, 
however, Florida and Pennsylvania, contained language 
intended to address these problems, but the language created 
new problems of its own. Florida’s six-month deathbed 
mortmain statute did not apply in cases where the “testator, by 
his will duly executed immediately next prior to such 
[deathbed] last will and more than six months before his death, 
[had] made a valid charitable bequest or devise in substantially 
the same amount for the same purpose or to the same 
beneficiary.”159 The exception in the Pennsylvania statute was 
for “an identical gift for substantially the same religious or 
charitable purpose.”160 The Pennsylvania language was slightly 
more specific as to amount than the Florida language 
(“identical gift” is more specific than “substantially the same 
amount”), while the Florida language was slightly more specific 
as to purposes (“the same purpose” as compared with 
“substantially the same . . . purpose”). But in each case the 
more specific language was so specific that courts could hardly 
have interpreted it strictly. For example, in In re Estate of 
Rauf,161 the testator, more than six months before her death, 
executed a will bequeathing the residue of her estate to two 
charities: the Salvation Army of New York City and a Cancer 
Fund in New York. Within six months of her death, she 
executed a new will leaving the residue of her estate to three 
charities: the Salvation Army at Ocala, Florida; the Marion 
County Heart Association; and Father Flanagan’s Boys’ 
Home.162 The court held that the three residuary bequests in 
the deathbed will were indeed “for the same purpose” as the 
two residuary bequests in her prior will and therefore were 
insulated from the reach of the mortmain statute, even though 
the charities named in the later will were, with one exception, 
not even close to identical with those named in the earlier 
will.163  
  
 159 FLA. STAT. § 731.19 (repealed 1974). 
 160 See In re Estate of Prynn, 315 A.2d 265, 266 n.6 (Pa. 1974). 
 161 213 So. 2d 31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968). 
 162 Id. at 32. 
 163 Id. at 32-33. 
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E. Constitutional Objections to Mortmain Statutes 
We have seen that the American mortmain statutes 
were deeply flawed. They could be easily circumvented by 
making inter vivos gifts or by designating alternative takers in 
the event of invalidity. They presented extremely difficult 
questions of interpretation. And they jeopardized estate 
planning techniques (charitable lead trusts and charitable 
remainder trusts, for example) that were needed to preserve a 
family’s after-tax wealth. All of these were good reasons for 
repealing the statutes, and most of them were in fact repealed 
for reasons such as these.164 But a number of mortmain statutes 
were held to be not merely unwise but unconstitutional: an 
extreme and unwarranted holding.  
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the state’s 
mortmain statute165 violated the due process clauses of the Ohio 
and U.S. constitutions because the distinction the statute made 
between bequests executed within six months before death and 
those executed more than six months before death was an 
arbitrary, irrational distinction bearing no relation to whether 
the particular bequest was the result of unsound judgment or 
undue influence.166 That objection cannot reflect a correct 
understanding of the requirements of due process inasmuch as 
legislatures routinely draw distinctions based on age or time. 
Some fifteen-year-olds are better drivers than some twenty-
year-olds, but a state is nonetheless permitted to enact and 
enforce an inflexible minimum driving age.167 Similarly, when 
Congress, anxious to prevent Social Security spousal death 
benefits from enriching partners in “sham marriages” entered 
into solely for the purpose of obtaining these benefits, enacted a 
  
 164 See, e.g., supra note 146 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the 
reasons behind the repeal in 1960 of England’s modern mortmain statute, see 
Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 291-95. 
 165 See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 166 Shriners’ Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Hester, 492 N.E.2d 153, 156 (Ohio 
1986). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania invalidated that state’s mortmain statute 
on similar grounds. In re Estate of Cavill, 329 A.2d 503, 505-06 (Pa. 1974). “The statute 
strikes down the charitable gifts of one in the best of health at the time of the execution 
of his will and regardless of age if he chances to die in an accident 29 days later. On the 
other hand, it leaves untouched the charitable bequests of another, aged and suffering 
from a terminal disease, who survives the execution of his will by 31 days. Such a 
combination of results can only be characterized as arbitrary.” Id. at 505-06; accord In 
re Estate of Kinyon, 615 P.2d 174, 176 (Mont. 1980) (invalidating Montana’s mortmain 
statute). 
 167 Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 571, 597 (2006). 
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provision denying such benefits to surviving spouses whose 
marriages had lasted less than nine months,168 the United 
States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
provision, even though not all nine-month marriages are shams 
and some sham marriages may last for more than nine 
months.169 The Court reasoned:  
[T]he question raised is not whether a statutory provision precisely 
filters out those, and only those, who are in the factual position 
which generated the [legislative] concern reflected in the statute. 
Such a rule would ban all prophylactic provisions. . . . The question 
is whether [the legislature], its concern having been reasonably 
aroused by the possibility of an abuse which it legitimately desired 
to avoid, could rationally have concluded both that a particular 
limitation or qualification would protect against its occurrence, and 
that the expense and other difficulties of individual determinations 
justified the inherent imprecision of a prophylactic rule.170  
When the Supreme Court of Florida invalidated that 
state’s mortmain statute,171 it took the faulty Ohio view, 
condemning as irrational the statutory distinction between 
bequests made within six months before the testator’s death 
and those made six months or more before the testator’s 
death.172 The Florida court also condemned the statute’s 
differentiation between bequests to charities and those to 
individuals: “There is no reason to believe that testators need 
more protection against charities than against unscrupulous 
and greedy relatives, friends, or acquaintances.”173 And the 
District of Columbia mortmain statute174 made a more 
troubling distinction—unique among American mortmain 
statutes175—between bequests to religious entities (invalid if 
made within thirty days of the testator’s death) and bequests to 
secular charities (valid regardless of when made). The District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals, citing the irrationality of that 
distinction, held that the statute violated the due process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment.176  
  
 168 42 U.S.C. § 416(c)(1)(E), (g)(1)(E) (2000). 
 169 Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 777 (1975). 
 170 Id. at 777. 
 171 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.803 (repealed 1991). 
 172 Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 70 (Fla. 
1990). 
 173 Id. at 70. 
 174 D.C. CODE ANN. § 18-302 (repealed 1981). 
 175 See Estate of French v. Doyle, 365 A.2d 621, 622 n.3 (D.C. 1976), appeal 
dismissed on other grounds, 434 U.S. 59 (1978). 
 176 Id. at 624-25. 
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The District of Columbia’s unique mortmain distinction 
between religious charities and secular charities might indeed 
have raised constitutional questions concerning the freedom of 
religion.177 However, a statutory rule distinguishing between all 
charities on the one hand and all noncharities on the other does 
not implicate First Amendment values. In the famous peyote 
case, Employment Division v. Smith,178 the United States 
Supreme Court held that “the right of free exercise does not 
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid 
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the 
law proscribes . . . conduct that his religion prescribes . . . .”179  
But what about the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion 
that the state mortmain statute’s charity/noncharity 
distinction, because of its arbitrariness, violated not the free 
exercise principle but the equal protection clause?180 Even if the 
state’s purpose in enacting the statute is legitimate, “Equal 
protection analysis,” said the Florida court, “requires that 
classifications be neither too narrow nor too broad to achieve 
[that] desired end.”181 The court reasoned that the mortmain 
statute was simultaneously too narrow and too broad: too 
narrow insofar as it failed to invalidate bequests to 
unscrupulous noncharitable legatees who were guilty of 
overreaching, and too broad insofar as it invalidated bequests 
to charitable legatees who were innocent of overreaching.182 
Was the Florida court correct in its equal protection analysis? 
Since the right to bequeath one’s property is an 
economic and not a fundamental right,183 proper equal 
  
 177 The trial court had found that the mortmain statute did indeed violate the 
First Amendment, but the appellate court, finding the due process objection 
determinative, expressly declined to consider the First Amendment issue. Id. at 623. 
The issue of freedom of religion is discussed in more detail infra in the text 
accompanying notes 325-378. 
 178 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see also infra text accompanying notes 326-331. 
 179 Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (internal punctuation and citations omitted); accord 
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). “[A] law that is 
neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental 
interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious 
practice.” Id. at 531. 
 180 Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1990). 
 181 Id. at 69-70. 
 182 Id. at 70. 
 183 In 1942, the United States Supreme Court famously declared: 
Rights of succession to the property of a deceased, whether by will or by 
intestacy, are of statutory creation, and the dead hand rules succession only 
by sufferance. Nothing in the Federal Constitution forbids the legislature of a 
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protection analysis rests with the so-called “rational basis” 
test,184 and “rational basis” does not demand “mathematical 
nicety.”185 In Dandridge v. Williams,186 for example, the State of 
Maryland had imposed a $250 cap on the monthly amount of 
need-based benefits that the state paid to any one family 
pursuant to its Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(“AFDC”) program. Because the same dollar cap applied to both 
large families and small ones, despite the presumably greater 
financial need of the former, the petitioners argued that the 
dollar cap “operate[d] to discriminate against them merely 
because of the size of their families, in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”187 The 
essence of the petitioners’ argument was one of overbreadth. 
Maryland imposed the cap, in part, to limit the financial 
benefits of unemployment and thereby encourage gainful 
employment;188 yet, argued petitioners, the cap was imposed 
even on families in which no one was employable: that is, 
families who could not possibly respond to that statutory 
incentive.189 (The statute was impliedly underbroad as well. If a 
family’s actual needs were below the $250 cap, such a family’s 
AFDC grants would equal their needs, so the statutory scheme 
and its cap would in that case generate no effective pressure to 
seek employment.) The United States Supreme Court rejected 
  
state to limit, condition, or even abolish the power of testamentary 
disposition over property within its jurisdiction. 
Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942) (punctuation altered). In 1987, the 
Court held that the federal government’s abrogation of the right to bequeath certain 
fractional interests in aboriginal tribal lands amounted to a “taking” of property that 
required compensation pursuant to the Fifth Amendment. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 
704, 717-18 (1987). Some scholars regarded Hodel as a signal that the Court was 
retreating from its 1942 rejection of a constitutional basis for a right to bequeath, while 
others read Hodel as creating only a minor exception to Irving Trust. See Sherman, 
supra note 58, at 1288-89. Noteworthy is the fact that state courts, long after Hodel 
was decided, continued to declare—and to cite pre-Hodel cases—that the right to 
bequeath is not a natural right but rather a statutory privilege. See, e.g., Estate of 
Della Sala v. Father Flanagan’s Boys’ Home, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 569, 572 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1999); Thompson v. Hardy, 43 S.W.3d 281, 285 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000); In re Estate of 
Long, 600 A.2d 619, 622 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). 
 184 See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1987) (Stevens, J., 
concurring); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970). 
 185 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). “Strict 
scrutiny” analysis does require mathematical nicety, often phrased as a requirement 
that the legislature choose “the least restrictive means of achieving” its end. Thomas v. 
Review Bd. Of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). 
 186 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
 187 Id. at 475. 
 188 Id. at 483. 
 189  Id. at 486. 
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the petitioners’ constitutional challenge, pointing out that 
while overbreadth could be a constitutionally fatal flaw in 
statutes impinging on First Amendment rights, it was an 
irrelevant consideration under the “rational basis” standard 
applicable to economic or social regulation.190  
[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must 
choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking 
the problem at all. It is enough that the State’s action be rationally 
based and free from invidious discrimination.191  
A state has a legitimate interest in regulating the 
devolution of property at death: that is, an interest in fostering 
an orderly transfer of material resources from one generation 
to the next. While a state could constitutionally abolish the 
right of testation and require that all estates devolve pursuant 
to the state’s intestacy statute,192 all states do in fact permit 
property owners to direct the devolution of their estates upon 
death.193 But in the absence of specific testamentary directions 
from a decedent, the state’s intestacy statute prescribes the 
manner in which the decedent’s property is to be distributed. 
This statutory distribution scheme is designed to approximate 
the distribution that decedents would have adopted had they 
made a will;194 indeed, the seventeenth century jurist Hugo 
Grotius believed that the very legitimacy of the rules of 
intestate succession depended on their correspondence with the 
presumed intentions of decedents.195 Thus, if a decedent 
expresses a desire to have her estate distributed to persons 
other than—or in shares different from—those set forth in the 
intestacy statute, she is expressing desires different from those 
the state presumes her to have. Consequently, a state acts 
rationally when it demands that the decedent express those 
unpredicted individuated wishes in a manner and under 
  
 190 Id. at 484-85. 
 191 Id. at 486-87 (citing Lindsley, 220 U.S. at 61). The Court’s language here 
was quite similar to the language it would use five years later in Weinberger v. Salfi, 
422 U.S. 749, 785 (1975), when it held that overbreadth had no bearing on a due 
process challenge to a piece of social/economic regulation. See supra text accompanying 
notes 168-170. 
 192 See supra note 183. 
 193  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS, Introduction (2003). 
 194 See King v. Riffee, 309 S.E.2d 85, 87-88 (W. Va. 1983); see also John T. 
Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern Wills Act, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 497, 501 (1977). 
 195 See Stanley N. Katz, Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance in the 
American Revolutionary Era, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1, 4 (1977). 
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circumstances suggesting particular thoughtfulness and 
voluntariness.196 Inasmuch as American intestacy statutes 
without exception prescribe distributions only to natural 
persons related to the decedent by blood or marriage,197 a state 
likewise acts rationally when it subjects to particular scrutiny 
bequests in favor of persons outside those categories: notably, 
corporate bodies such as religious or secular charities. 
Scholars have identified other state objectives 
underlying intestacy statutes: objectives related not to the 
presumed intentions of property owners but rather to the 
interests of society as a whole. But these societal objectives, 
too, suggest that a state may properly subject institutional 
bequests to special scrutiny. For example, some scholars have 
observed that intestacy statutes serve society’s interests by 
“protect[ing] the financially dependent family [and by] . . . 
promot[ing] and encourag[ing] the nuclear family.”198 Clearly 
the state has an interest in thwarting a testator who intends, 
by bequeathing his property to nonfamily members, to 
pauperize his dependents and leave to the state the burden of 
supporting them. Another societal interest served by intestacy 
statutes is the avoidance of disharmony within the particular 
family and the avoidance of disdain for the legal system 
generally that would be spawned by a distribution scheme that 
potential recipients regarded as unwise or unfair.199  
It should be self-evident that excessive or impulsive 
bequests to charity are especially calculated to engender 
feelings of resentment and ill-usage among all the testator’s 
family members200 (not merely the particular family members 
who receive less than other particular family members), and 
  
 196 The formal requirements that states impose by statute on the execution of 
wills—e.g., the requirement that the document be signed by the testator and attested 
by witnesses in the testator’s presence—are designed in part to reassure courts that 
the testator understood the legal consequences of her act and that she was free from 
imposition at the time she performed that act. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 5, at 1-10. 
And if, despite those formal precautions, the testator executes a will that—because of 
fraud, duress, or undue influence by extrinsic parties—does not represent her wishes, 
the document will be declared invalid. 
 197 Most states’ intestacy statutes prescribe identical treatment for siblings of 
the half-blood and siblings of the whole-blood. Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws 
to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1, 2 n.9 (2000). 
 198 Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at 
Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 
319, 324 (1978). 
 199 LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 2-5 (4th ed. 
2006). 
 200 See supra text accompanying notes 119-121. 
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thus a state bent on minimizing such unpleasantness could 
quite rationally treat each charitable bequest as a potential 
intrafamilial casus belli.201 Moreover, the special indulgences 
accorded charitable transfers, including the exemption from 
the rule against perpetuities, give the state cause for even 
greater concern than in the case of bequests to individuals.202  
The key words here are “excessive” and “impulsive.” 
How might a state preclude “excessive” charitable bequests 
while continuing to allow nonexcessive ones? The state might 
authorize probate judges to strike down or reduce those 
charitable bequests that they regard as unreasonably large, but 
such a free-floating discretionary power would make reliable 
tax planning impossible, since attorneys would have no way of 
predicting the portion of a client’s estate that would end up 
passing to charity, and every will containing a charitable 
bequest would be potentially subject to judicial modification. 
Furthermore, judges would be asked to make a determination 
of “reasonableness” unmoored to any definable standards, and 
wildly inconsistent holdings could be expected. On the other 
hand, the fixed percentage limits imposed by American 
mortmain statutes of the “percentage restriction” type203 
represent a more practicable approach to the excessiveness 
problem; and the inflexibility of such arithmetic, prophylactic 
solutions does not render them constitutionally objectionable.204  
How might a state preclude “impulsive” charitable 
bequests while continuing to allow thoughtful ones? If the 
impulse emanates from another person, the doctrine of “undue 
influence” might furnish a solution by invalidating the bequest. 
If the impulse is largely self-generated, proof of a lack of 
“testamentary capacity” might work. Both doctrines proceed on 
  
 201 A number of courts, in deciding whether a doubtful charitable gift is 
invalid, have taken into account the family status of those objecting to the gift, leaning 
towards overturning the gift when the objectants were close relatives of the transferor 
and toward upholding the gift when the objectants were distant relatives. For example, 
in Wilber v. Owens, 65 A.2d 843 (N.J. 1949), the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld 
the vice-chancellor’s decision to rescue a dubious charitable gift by applying cy pres, id. 
at 848, and, in upholding the decision, the Court noted that the testator “had no kin 
nearer than first cousins.” Id. at 846; accord Howard Sav. Inst. v. Peep, 170 A.2d 39, 45 
(N.J. 1961). See generally Robert J. Lynn, The Questionable Testamentary Gift to 
Charity: A Suggested Approach to Judicial Decision, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 450, 463-65 
(1963). State legislators displayed a similar instinct when they enacted mortmain 
statutes that invalidated charitable bequests only when challenged by particular 
relatives. See supra text accompanying notes 137-139. 
 202 See supra notes 3, 74-76, and 85. 
 203 See supra text accompanying note 125. 
 204 See supra text accompanying note 170. 
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the notion that, had the testator not been subjected to undue 
influence or not been laboring under some sort of mental 
aberration, he would not have made the challenged bequest; 
and therefore the state acts rationally when it refuses to give 
effect to the bequest of a testator whose volition was so 
undermined. But actual evidence of undue influence or mental 
deficiency is rare. Will contestants generally must rely on 
circumstantial evidence to prove their case,205 and the 
availability of circumstantial evidence cannot always be 
counted upon. If a testator whose prior wills contained no 
charitable bequests writes a deathbed will bequeathing 
property to a particular secular or religious charity, it seems 
not unreasonable to infer that, had he not been facing a 
fearfully imminent death, he would have acted differently or 
not acted at all.206 Rather than relying upon the difficult and 
time-consuming task of sifting through circumstantial evidence 
that the testator’s own morbid notions or the pressure of 
another person undermined the testator’s mental faculties, a 
state acts rationally when it decides upon a prophylactic rule, 
however imprecise,207 like a mortmain statute of the deathbed 
type. 
II. A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF UNDUE INFLUENCE 
Although mortmain statutes can respond effectively—
and constitutionally—to a problem that continues to blight 
American families’ lives, the harshness and inflexibility of 
those statutes argue against their reenactment. Consequently, 
the doctrine of undue influence must continue to serve as the 
primary bulwark against the imposition by charitable or 
religious organizations upon the mind and free agency of 
anxious testators.208  
  
 205 See infra text accompanying note 215. 
 206 Indeed, scholars, judges, and legislatures have, for centuries, questioned 
the propriety of deathbed charitable bequests. See supra notes 1, 17, 18, 59, 101, 118, 
and 123 and accompanying text. 
 207 See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 208 Although mortmain statutes applied only to testamentary transfers, the 
doctrine of undue influence applies to both testamentary and inter vivos conveyances. 
In determining whether a conveyance resulted from undue influence, courts generally 
apply the same standards in the testamentary and inter vivos contexts. MCGOVERN & 
KURTZ, supra note 73, § 7.3. Consequently, this portion of the Article will cite, without 
distinguishing between them, both challenges to testamentary transfers and challenges 
to inter vivos transfers, unless clarity or doctrinal accuracy demands that the 
distinction be made. As to differences in the limitations rules applicable to these two 
types of challenges, see John B. Jarboe, Undue Influence and Gifts to Religious 
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If a purported will does not represent the wishes of the 
testator who signed it, the instrument is not a valid will, and 
the court having jurisdiction over the matter will refuse to 
admit the instrument to probate. The charge of undue 
influence, as a ground for contesting a will, is a charge that the 
will reflects not the wishes of the testator but rather those of a 
person who destroyed the testator’s free agency and caused him 
to execute a will representing the wishes of that other person. 
This displacement or substitution of agency is the vital 
underpinning of undue influence, since people persuade people 
every day without destroying free agency and without 
invalidating wills that reflect such persuasion.209 For influence 
to be “undue,” it must amount to more than “the influence 
which springs from natural affection or kind offices[; it must 
instead spring] from fear, coercion, or any other cause that 
deprives the testator of this free agency in the disposition of 
property. . . .”210 But however malign or sinister may be the 
intentions of a person charged with imposition upon the 
testator, her conduct does not constitute undue influence 
unless it caused the testator to execute a will that did not 
represent his own wishes.211 And conversely (and more 
important, for purposes of this Article), the propriety or even 
beneficence of an influencer’s motives will not protect a 
purported will from a successful contest if that influence in fact 
overcame the testator’s free agency.212 The purpose of the 
doctrine is not to deprive wrongdoers of their ill-gotten gains213 
  
Organizations, 35 CATH. LAW. 271, 273 (1994). As to differences relating to a certain 
evidentiary presumption, see infra text accompanying notes. 278-287. 
 209 Henderson v. Jackson, 111 N.W. 821, 823 (Iowa 1907). 
 210 Carpenter v. Horace Mann Life Ins. Co., 730 S.W.2d 502, 507 (Ark. Ct. 
App. 1987). 
 211 1 WILLIAM HERBERT PAGE, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 15.6 (2003). 
 212 In re Craven’s Will, 86 S.E. 587, 591-92 (N.C. 1915); Anderson v. 
Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95, 100 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); see Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d at 505 
(stating that moral turpitude on the part of the influencer is not required for undue 
influence to be found). 
 213 Some laws relating to wills do indeed target wrongdoers. The law of almost 
every American jurisdiction bars an intestate decedent’s murderer from inheriting any 
portion of the victim’s estate, even though the murderer is an heir of the decedent. See 
Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 803, 844-
47 (1993). In some states, a person convicted of the abuse or financial exploitation of an 
intestate elderly or disabled person is likewise barred from inheriting from the victim, 
even though the wrongdoer is an heir. See, e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-6.2 
(2007). But the law of undue influence does not target wrongdoers as such. If a 
decedent’s will is declared invalid on the ground of undue influence, with the result 
that the decedent becomes intestate, the person successfully charged with exerting 
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but rather to ensure that the testamentary wishes given effect 
by the probate court truly are the testator’s wishes: that is, to 
ensure that the will is not “the product of a captive mind.”214  
Because undue influence is generally exerted in secret, 
direct evidence of such influence almost never exists; a finding 
of undue influence is usually based entirely on circumstantial 
evidence.215 And to that end, black-letter law traditionally 
identifies four elements of the circumstantial case: four 
elements that need to be proved in order for a will to be 
rejected on the ground of undue influence. Despite the 
circularity of this four-part “test,” courts and commentators 
quote it so often that it is worth quoting again. It must be 
shown 
(1) that the testator was susceptible to undue influence, (2) that the 
influencer had the disposition or motive to exercise undue influence, 
(3) that the influencer had the opportunity to exercise undue 
influence, and (4) that the disposition is the result of the influence.216  
Some of these elements require further elaboration. 
Although the first of these four elements presupposes that the 
testator’s condition or circumstances rendered him especially 
susceptible to influence,217 this element does not require that 
the testator have been so far gone as to lack the mental 
capacity to make a valid will.218 Indeed, strictly speaking, a 
claim of undue influence is logically inconsistent with a claim 
of testamentary incapacity inasmuch as undue influence 
  
undue influence may still share in the decedent’s intestate property if he or she is an 
heir of the decedent. In re Randall’s Estate, 132 P.2d 763, 766 (Idaho 1942). 
 214 PAGE, supra note 211, at § 15.3. 
 215 In re Ferrill’s Will, 640 P.2d 489, 493 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981); see Smith v. 
Moore, 176 So. 2d 868, 871 (Ala. 1965); In re Estate of Olsson, 344 S.W.2d 171, 173-74 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1961); see also In re The Bible Speaks, 869 F.2d 628, 642 (1st Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989). 
 216 DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 85, at 159; accord Burgess v. Bohle (In re 
Hull’s Estate), 146 P.2d 242, 245 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944); In re Estate of Herbert, 979 P.2d 
39, 53 (Haw. 1999); In re Estate of Opsahl, 448 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); 
Estate of Kamesar, 259 N.W.2d 733, 737-39 (Wis. 1977). 
 217 See, e.g., Gardiner v. Goertner, 149 So. 186, 189 (Fla. 1932); Wallace v. 
Scott, 844 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992); In re Cotcher’s Estate, 264 N.W. 325, 
327 (Mich. 1936). 
 218 In re Estate of Miller, 778 N.E.2d 262, 267 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). To lack the 
mental capacity to write a valid will, a testator must be very “far gone” indeed; a 
person who lacks sufficient mental capacity to write an enforceable contract or to 
manage his own property may still have sufficient mental capacity to execute a valid 
will. Gibony v. Foster, 130 S.W. 314, 323 (Mo. 1910); see Bye v. Mattingly, 975 S.W.2d 
451, 456 (Ky. 1998) (“Merely . . . possessing a failing memory, momentary 
forgetfulness, weakness of mental powers or lack of strict coherence in conversation 
does not render one incapable of validly executing a will.”). 
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postulates that a decedent’s testamentary intent was overcome 
by another person while testamentary incapacity postulates 
that the decedent was incapable of forming any testamentary 
intent in the first place.219 In point of fact, however, many 
contestants who challenge a will on undue influence grounds do 
also raise separate objections based on lack of testamentary 
capacity,220 for the two doctrines are more closely related than 
strict logic would indicate: a relation that implicates the fourth 
element of undue influence. 
The fourth element of undue influence—often reworded 
coveted result by Wisconsin courts221—requires that the 
provisions of the will appear on their face to reflect the desires 
of the alleged influencer rather than reflecting what one would 
suppose to be the “natural” desires of the testator: that is, that 
the will fail to provide for the natural objects of the testator’s 
bounty. Thus, a substantial bequest to a mere casual 
acquaintance suggests undue influence when the testator’s 
father was still living at the time she executed her will,222 as 
does a substantial bequest to a housekeeper to the exclusion of 
several nieces and nephews who had been named in prior 
wills.223 “Unnatural” provisions are hardly conclusive proof of 
undue influence—indeed, a testator is theoretically permitted 
to be as arbitrary and unfair in her will as she wishes without 
thereby forfeiting the right to have her testamentary directions 
honored224—but they do raise suspicions of such influence. And 
  
 219 In re Estate of Aageson, 702 P.2d 338, 342 (Mont. 1985). 
 220 See, e.g., First Sec. Bank & Trust Co. v. Christianson (In re Estate of 
Dankbar), 430 N.W.2d 124, 127 (Iowa 1988); Hodges v. Hodges, 692 S.W.2d 361, 365 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985); McKee v. Stoddard, 780 P.2d 736, 740 (Or. Ct. App. 1989); Gold’s 
Estate, 182 A.2d 707, 709 (Pa. 1962); In re Estate of Burt, 169 A.2d 32, 34-35 (Vt. 
1961). 
 221 See, e.g., Lee ex rel. Estate of Kamesar v. Kamesar (In re Estate of 
Kamesar), 259 N.W.2d 733, 737 (Wis. 1977). 
 222 See In re Estate of Dankbar, 430 N.W.2d at 131. 
 223 See In re Will of Ridge, 275 S.E.2d 424 (N.C. 1981). In most successful will 
contests based on undue influence, the influencer is named as a beneficiary. That is, 
the result “coveted” by the influencer was financial benefit for himself. But occasionally 
an influencer might pressure a testator to benefit someone else, and such pressure can 
still constitute undue influence even though the influencer was not himself a 
beneficiary. Bedree v. Bedree, 528 N.E.2d 1128, 1129 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (the 
influencer was the grantor’s husband; the grantees were his sisters); Needels v. 
Roberts, 879 S.W.2d 550, 551 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (the influencer was the testator’s 
wife; the beneficiary was the wife’s son by a prior marriage); Suagee v. Cook (In re 
Estate of Maheras), 897 P.2d 268, 274 (Okla. 1995) (the influencer was a pastor; the 
beneficiary was the pastor’s church). 
 224 See, e.g., Joseph v. Grisham 482 S.E.2d 251, 252 (Ga. 1997) (upholding a 
will even though the testator disinherited her children in favor of her grandchildren); 
Nelson v. O’Connor, 473 P.2d 161, 162-63 (Or. 1970) (upholding a will even though the 
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not only do unnatural bequests support an inference of undue 
influence, they may also support an inference of testamentary 
incapacity. A testator, to be judged mentally competent, must 
know and understand who the natural objects of her bounty 
are.225 Consequently, a will that “unnaturally” prefers strangers 
in blood to significant family members may suggest not only 
the pernicious influence of an outsider (undue influence) but 
also a failure on the testator’s part to know the identities of the 
natural objects of her bounty (testamentary incapacity). 
Because a testator possessed of a normal strength of will is 
unlikely to yield to undue influence, Lawrence Frolik has 
suggested that a finding of undue influence presupposes an 
intermediate level of mental deficiency, neither fully capable 
nor fully incapable.226 He calls it “marginal testamentary 
capacity,” between that of the fully incapacitated testator, who 
is barred from executing any will at all, and that of the 
“normal” testator, who is permitted to execute any will at all, 
including an “unnatural” one.227 
For influence to be “undue” in the context of a will 
contest, the influence must have operated at the time the 
testator executed his will. The influencer’s actual conduct need 
not have coincided with the execution; what is required is only 
that the constraining effect of that conduct have been felt by 
the testator at the very time he executed his will.228 In Trust 
  
testator disinherited her only child in favor of her neighbor); see also Clapp v. 
Fullerton, 34 N.Y. 190, 197 (1866) (“The right of a testator to dispose of his estate, 
depends neither on the justice of his prejudices nor the soundness of his reasoning. He 
may do what he will with his own; and if there be no defect of testamentary capacity, 
and no undue influence or fraud, the law gives effect to his will, though its provisions 
are unreasonable and unjust.”). 
 225 Wrigley v. Wrigley (In re Estate of Wrigley), 433 N.E.2d 995, 1003 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1982); Bye v. Mattingly, 975 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Ky. 1998); Estate of Record, 534 A.2d 
1319, 1321 (Me. 1987); In re Will of Wasson, 562 So. 2d 74, 77 (Miss. 1990). 
 226 Lawrence A. Frolik, The Strange Interplay of Testamentary Capacity and 
the Doctrine of Undue Influence: Are We Protecting Older Testators or Overriding 
Individual Preferences?, 24 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 253, 264-66 (2001). 
 227 Id. 
 228 Tobin v. Jenkins, 29 Ark. 151, 157 (1874); Trust Co. of Ga. v. Ivey, 173 S.E. 
648, 654 (Ga. 1934); Tawney v. Long, 76 Pa. 106, 115 (1874). 
  In 1983, the Idaho legislature, concerned that for-profit nursing homes 
might exert undue influence on residents to induce them to bequeath property to the 
homes, enacted a statute making such bequests void in certain circumstances. 1983 
Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 236, § 1, at 642. Originally, the statute applied only if the 
testator resided at the legatee-home at the time the will containing such a bequest was 
executed. In 1994, when the statute was amended to create a mere presumption of 
undue influence rather than an absolute bar to such bequests, the legislature removed 
the requirement that the testator had to be in residence when the will was executed 
(though the testator still had to have resided in the legatee-home within one year of his 
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Co. of Georgia v. Ivey, for instance, a will was successfully 
challenged on the basis of the undue influence of a person who 
had already died by the time the testator executed the 
contested instruments.229 The testator’s wife, Dosia, had written 
a will leaving the entire residue of her estate for the founding 
of a residence for elderly “gentlewomen.”230 Evidence was 
introduced showing that when Doria learned that the will 
executed by her husband made no provision for Dosia’s pet 
project, Dosia harassed him with constant appeals and threats 
and warned him that he would never again live peaceably with 
her unless he changed his will to suit her wishes.231 And the 
testator, a man in a weakened and diseased condition, was 
thereby induced to change his will so as to bequeath 
substantial assets to Dosia’s residence.232 Dosia predeceased the 
testator, yet even after her death, the testator executed two 
codicils increasing the share of his estate that would pass to 
Doria’s residence.233 After rejecting on undue influence grounds 
the last will that the testator had executed while Dosia was 
still live, the court also rejected these last two codicils on the 
ground of Dosia’s posthumous undue influence over her 
husband.234 “[T]he influence and domination of [Dosia] over [the 
testator] . . . [was] so complete and deep rooted that they 
persisted even after the death of [Dosia], and continued to 
dominate and control his will and to substitute her will 
therefore [sic], in the disposition of his estate . . . .”235  
Dosia’s conduct as reported in the Ivey case illustrates 
one kind of conduct that can constitute undue influence. What 
other kinds of conduct might amount to undue influence? If 
they succeed in overcoming a testator’s free agency, threats of 
violence can certainly constitute undue influence,236 though 
they might be more properly characterized as duress inasmuch 
  
death for the statute to apply). 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 350, § 1, p. 1110. The statute 
is now codified at IDAHO CODE § 15-2-616 (2007). By removing the requirement of 
contemporaneous residence, the legislature implicitly acknowledged that the effect of 
undue influence can continue to be felt by its target even after the influential conduct 
has ceased. 
 229 Trust Co. of Georgia v. Ivey, 173 S.E. 648, 655 (Ga. 1934). 
 230 Id. at 649. 
 231 Id. at 651. 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. at 652-53. 
 234 Id. at 655. 
 235 Id. at 652. 
 236 See, e.g., Gay v. Gillilan, 5 S.W. 7, 10 (Mo. 1887). 
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as such threats are criminal violations of the law.237 But threats 
to do perfectly legal acts—threats to divorce the testator,238 
threats to bring a criminal prosecution against the testator,239 
threats to abandon a sick or imperiled testator,240 threats to put 
the testator in a nursing home241—can likewise constitute 
undue influence.242 A pattern of harassing requests for money 
can constitute undue influence.243 Playing upon the testator’s 
religious beliefs or beliefs in spiritualism can likewise 
constitute undue influence.244 So too can a pattern of behavior 
calculated to isolate the testator from the natural objects of her 
bounty, either isolating her emotionally by making false 
statements about those objects or isolating her physically.245  
The fact that the influential statements made to the 
testator were true, or that the influencer believed them to be 
true, will not prevent a proper finding of undue influence.246 
Undue influence is not fraud. One can find the occasional old 
case that describes undue influence as a “species of fraud,”247 
but such usage is mere shorthand. Indeed, one of these old 
  
 237 See MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 73, at 305. 
 238 Needels v. Roberts, 879 S.W.2d 550, 551 (Mo. App. 1994). 
 239 In re Brunor, 47 N.Y.S. 681, 684-85 (App. Div. 1897). 
 240 Pohlmann v. Naschel (In re Pohlmann’s Estate), 201 P.2d 446, 452 (Cal. 
App. 1949); In re Sickles’s Will, 50 A. 577, 579 (Prerog. Ct. N.J. 1901), aff’d, 53 A. 1125 
(Ct. Err. & App. N.J. 1902). 
 241 In re Panek, 667 N.Y.S.2d 177, 179-80 (App. Div. 1997). 
 242 One should keep in mind, of course, that if these threats do not in fact 
deprive the testator of his free agency, the threats do not constitute undue influence. 
See, e.g., Kirby v. Manies, 351 S.W.2d 429, 430 (Ark. 1961) (finding that a threat by the 
testator’s step-grandson to abandon her if she failed to make a will in his favor did not 
constitute undue influence inasmuch as the testator was not in any way helpless or 
dependent). 
 243 Erb v. Lee, 430 N.E.2d 869, 872 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982). 
 244 In re Bishop’s Estate, 39 P.2d 201, 201-02 (Cal. 1934); Orchardson v. 
Cofield, 49 N.E. 197, 202 (Ill. 1897); see also Ingersoll v. Gourley, 139 P. 207 (Wash. 
1914). In this last case, the trial court had held the will invalid on the grounds of both 
testamentary incapacity and undue influence. Id. at 207. The state supreme court 
affirmed the trial court’s finding of testamentary incapacity but did not address the 
issue of undue influence. Id. at 209. 
 245 In re Stoddart’s Estate, 163 P. 1010, 1011-13 (Cal. 1917) (finding that 
allegations that influencers told the testator that her married daughters had married 
extravagant husbands who were likely to dissipate any inheritance were sufficient to 
state an undue influence claim); Cox v. Wall, 179 N.E.2d 815, 816-17 (Mass. 1962) 
(physical isolation); McPeak v. McPeak, 593 N.W.2d 180, 185 (Mich. App. 1999) 
(finding that a lengthy “pattern of conduct directed at isolating” the decedent sustained 
a finding of undue influence). 
 246 Roberts-Douglas v. Meares, 624 A.2d 405, 420 (D.C. Ct. of App. 1992), 
modified on other grounds and reaff’d, 624 A.2d 431 (D.C. 1993); see also Gockel v. 
Gockel, 66 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Mo. 1933); Corrigan v. Pironi, 23 A. 355, 355 (N.J. 1891). 
 247 See, e.g., Coghill v. Kennedy, 24 So. 459, 468 (Ala. 1898); Flanigan v. 
Smith, 169 N.E. 767, 769 (Ill. 1929). 
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cases that use the inaccurate “species of fraud” phrase goes on 
immediately to state the law correctly: 
Deceit is the use of any trick, false statement, secret device, or false 
pretense to defraud another; and it is clear that undue influence may 
be exercised without the use of any of these means,—for example, 
through the imposition of fear, or constant importunity, to which the 
testator yields from a desire for peace. It was not necessary to aver 
that fraud or deceit was practiced upon the testatrix [to justify an 
inference of undue influence].248  
Doctrinally, the distinction between fraud and undue 
influence is clear. In a case of undue influence, the testator’s 
free agency has been destroyed, and the will does not represent 
her wishes. In a case of fraud, the testator’s free agency is 
unimpaired and the will does indeed represent her wishes, but 
she formulated her wishes on the basis of false information 
deceitfully proffered. 
In a will contest brought on the ground of undue 
influence, the contestant bears the burden of persuasion.249 In 
some jurisdictions, this burden must be met by clear and 
convincing evidence;250 other jurisdictions require only a 
preponderance of the evidence.251 Because a contestant usually 
has available to him only circumstantial evidence with which 
to meet this burden,252 courts have attempted to ease the 
contestant’s difficulties by developing a two-part test that can 
enable him to raise a presumption of undue influence: 
A presumption of undue influence arises if [1] the alleged 
[influencer253] was in a confidential relationship with the [testator] 
and [2] there were suspicious circumstances surrounding the 
preparation, formulation, or execution of the [will] . . . .254  
  
 248 Coghill, 24 So. at 468. 
 249 See, e.g., Williams v. Thornton, 145 So. 2d 828, 829 (Ala. 1962); In re 
Estate of Herbert, 979 P.2d 39, 54 (Haw. 1999); In re Estate of Kline, 613 N.E.2d 1329, 
1336-37 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Martin v. O’Connor, 406 S.W.2d 41, 43 (Mo. 1966). 
 250 See, e.g., Russo v. Miller, 559 A.2d 354, 357 (Me. 1989); Anthony v. 
Evangelical Lutheran Church (In re Anthony), 121 N.W.2d 772, 776-77 (Minn. 1963). 
 251 See, e.g., In re Estate of Herbert, 979 P.2d 39, 54 (Haw. 1999); In re Estate 
of Duebendorfer, 721 N.W.2d 438, 447 (S.D. 2006). 
 252 See supra text accompanying note 215. 
 253 The Restatement uses the word “wrongdoer,” not “influencer.” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 (2001).  
I believe “wrongdoer” to be an ill-advised term in this context inasmuch as the 
influencer’s conduct need not be wrongful to be undue. See supra note 212. 
 254 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 8.3 cmt. f (2001) (emphasis added); see In re Ferrill’s Will, 640 P.2d 489, 493 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1981); Knutsen v. Krippendorf, 862 P.2d 509, 515 (Or. Ct. App. 1993). It should be 
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A confidential relationship is a relationship of 
inequality: a relationship in which the testator reposes an 
exceptional degree of reliance on the integrity and loyalty of 
another, either because of that other person’s knowledge or 
status or because of the testator’s dependence or subservience. 
Some relationships—known in law as fiduciary relationships—
are confidential relationships as a matter of law. For example, 
the law imposes fiduciary duties on an attorney vis-à-vis her 
client; therefore, for purposes of this presumption of undue 
influence, the testator’s attorney is in a confidential 
relationship with the testator.255 Similarly, the relationship 
between the trustee of a trust and the beneficiary of that trust 
is a confidential relationship,256 as is the relationship between a 
court-appointed guardian and her ward.257  
Outside the narrow confines of fiduciary relationships, 
the existence or nonexistence of a confidential relationship 
between influencer and testator has been treated as a question 
of fact.258 Such nonfiduciary confidential relationships generally 
fall into one of two categories, reliant relationships and 
dominant-subservient relationships,259 although the categories 
often overlap. The first category comprises relationships based 
  
noted that the contestant need not establish the existence of a confidential relationship 
to win her case. That is, undue influence can be found even though no confidential 
relationship existed between the alleged influencer and the testator. Blits v. Blits, 468 
So. 2d 320, 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). A finding of a confidential relationship is a 
requirement only of raising this presumption of undue influence. But this presumption 
has considerable practical importance, and many a will has been set aside on undue 
influence grounds where a confidential relationship existed that would not have been 
set aside in the absence of a confidential relationship. See Roberts-Douglas v. Meares, 
624 A.2d 405, 421 (D.C. 1992), modified on other grounds and reaff’d, 624 A.2d 431 
(D.C. 1993). 
 255 See, e.g., Allen v. Estate of Dutton, 394 So. 2d 132, 134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1980); In re Estate of Novak, 458 N.W.2d 221, 224, 227 (Neb. 1990); Haynes v. First 
Nat’l State Bank of New Jersey, 432 A.2d 890, 897 (N.J. 1981); In re Putnam’s Will, 
177 N.E. 399, 400 (N.Y. 1931). 
 256 See, e.g., In re Estate of Cass, 719 A.2d 595, 598 (N.H. 1998). 
 257 Pepin v. Ryan, 47 A.2d 846, 847 (Conn. 1946); Birch v. Coleman, 691 
S.W.2d 875, 878 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985); Consul Gen. of Yugoslavia v. Thomas (In re 
Basich’s Estate), 398 N.E.2d 1182, 1186 (Ill. Ct. App. 1979); Estate of Bodman v. 
Bodman, 674 So. 2d 1245, 1246 (Miss. 1996). 
 258 See In re Estate of Olsson, 344 S.W.2d 171, 173 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (“If a 
rule of general application exists at all with respect to undue influence cases, it is that 
each case must stand on its own bottom as to the legal sufficiency of the facts proven.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
  Later in this Article, I shall recommend treating certain nonfiduciary 
relationships between pastor and communicant as confidential as a matter of law. See 
infra text accompanying notes 339-342. 
 259 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 8.3 cmt. g (2003). 
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on special trust and confidence, where, for example, the 
testator “was accustomed to be guided by the judgment or 
advice of the alleged [influencer] or was justified in placing 
confidence in the belief that the alleged [influencer] would act 
in the interest of the [testator],” as in the case of the testator 
and his financial advisor.260 The second category comprises 
relationships in which the testator “was subservient to the 
alleged [influencer’s] dominant influence,” such as might exist 
between an enfeebled testator and his hired caregiver.261  
A good example of a reliant confidential relationship is 
to be found in In re Estate of Borsch.262 The testator and the 
alleged influencer, one Alan Herbert, had been friends for 
twenty-five years and saw each other on a daily basis and often 
ate meals together.263 Herbert and Herbert’s wife frequently did 
odd jobs for the testator, “such as mowing his lawn and driving 
him to town.”264 The testator consulted the Herberts (especially 
Alan Herbert) “on all his business and personal matters” and 
“on just about anything that came along.”265 Alan Herbert 
helped the testator prepare an inventory of his assets that the 
testator’s attorney had requested, and he also prepared at the 
testator’s request lists of the testator’s mining claims.266 Indeed, 
the testator “frequently asked [Herbert] to do things like that 
for him, to write letters, make notes, whatever he happened to 
have that needed writing.”267 Based on all these facts, the court 
concluded that a confidential relationship existed between Alan 
Herbert and the testator.268  
An example of a dominant-subservient confidential 
relationship is to be found in Gentry v. Rigsby.269 The alleged 
influencer was Dorothy Rigsby: the testator’s friend and, 
evidently, paid caregiver. Evidence showed that she “pressured 
[the testator] into going to places and participating in activities 
  
 260 Id. 
 261 Id. 
 262 353 N.W.2d 346 (S.D. 1984). 
 263 Id. at 348. Evidence showed that the testator feared missing some of these 
dining engagements lest Herbert and his wife “get mad at me.” Id. at 350. Such 
evidence suggests that this confidential relationship was not exclusively of the reliant 
type but also had elements of the dominant-subservient type. 
 264 Id. at 350. 
 265 Id. at 348. 
 266 Id. at 349. 
 267 Id.  
 268 Id. at 351. 
 269 No. 01A01-9610-CV-00455, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 419 (Ct. App. June 11, 
1997). 
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in which he had no desire.”270 At one point, she advised the 
testator against taking some medication prescribed by his 
doctor, and he followed Rigsby’s advice.271 The testator “was an 
emotional man who frequently cried,” and “[m]ore than one 
witness testified that [the testator] did whatever Rigsby 
said.”272 And on at least four occasions during the last eleven 
months of the testator’s death, Rigsby drove him to local banks 
where the testator added Rigsby’s name as joint owner for a 
number of accounts and certificates of deposit.273 With all of 
these facts before it, the court held that a confidential 
relationship existed between the testator and Rigsby.274  
But in order to raise a presumption of undue influence, 
a will contestant must do more than prove the existence of a 
confidential relationship. She must also prove the existence of 
what the Restatement of Property calls “suspicious 
circumstances.”275 In the Borsch case, for example, evidence 
showed that Alan Herbert advised the testator that his earlier 
will (which benefited the testator’s family) “won’t stand up for 
thirty seconds” and participated quite actively in the 
preparation of the testator’s last will, which left virtually the 
entire estate to Herbert and Herbert’s wife.276 The comments 
accompanying the Restatement of Property offer a nonexclusive 
list of eight factors that may be considered suspicious 
circumstances for purposes of raising this presumption of 
undue influence where a confidential relationship exists: 
(1) the extent to which the [testator] was in a weakened condition, 
physically, mentally, or both, and therefore susceptible to undue 
influence; 
(2) the extent to which the alleged [influencer] participated in the 
preparation or procurement of the will . . .; 
(3) whether the [testator] received independent advice from an 
attorney . . . in preparing the will . . .; 
(4) whether the will . . . was prepared in secrecy or in haste; 
  
 270 Gentry, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 419 at *9. 
 271 Id. 
 272 Id. at *15-16. 
 273 Id. 
 274 Id. 
 275 See infra note 259 and accompanying text; see also Hurd v. Brown (In re 
Baird’s Estate), 168 P. 561, 563 (Cal. 1917); Barton v. Beck’s Estate, 195 A.2d 63, 67 
(Me. 1963); In re Estate of Borsch, 353 N.W.2d 346, 348 (S.D. 1984). 
 276 In re Estate of Borsch, 353 N.W.2d at 347, 350-51. 
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(5) whether the [testator’s] attitude toward others had changed by 
reason of his or her relationship with the alleged [influencer]; 
(6) whether there is a decided discrepancy between a new and 
previous wills . . . of the [testator]; 
(7) whether there was a continuity of purpose running through 
former wills . . . indicating a settled intent in the disposition of his or 
her property[: a continuity that the challenged will evidently did not 
reflect]; and 
(8) whether the disposition of the property is such that a reasonable 
person would regard it as unnatural, unjust, or unfair, for example, 
whether the disposition abruptly and without apparent reason 
disinherited a faithful and deserving family member.277  
One should note that the Restatement’s list does not 
include a mere bequest in favor of a person with whom the 
testator had a confidential relationship. Indeed, treating every 
such bequest as a suspicious circumstance would threaten the 
validity of a wide variety of small or routine bequests to 
persons who happened to be the testator’s caregiver or 
physician or guardian. Oddly enough, courts have, in the inter 
vivos context, treated a gift in any amount or situation as a 
suspicious circumstance.278 But in the testamentary context 
they seem to agree with the Restatement’s implication that a 
mere bequest to the confidential party is not considered 
suspicious.279 For a bequest to be suspicious, it must suggest 
overreaching: for example, a bequest to the confidential party 
amounting to a substantial portion of the estate,280 or a bequest 
to the confidential party that disadvantages the natural objects 
of the testator’s bounty.281  
If a will contestant raises a presumption of undue 
influence, the burden then shifts to the proponent, but courts 
disagree as to the nature of the burden that is shifted. Some 
  
 277 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 8.3 cmt. h (2003). See Estate of Hamilton v. Morris, 67 S.W.3d 786, 793 (Tenn. App. 
2001). 
 278 See, e.g., Upman v. Clarke, 753 A.2d 4, 5 (Md. 2000); DesMarais v. 
Desjardins, 664 A.2d 840, 844 (Me. 1995); Summit Bank v. Quake, 631 N.E.2d 13, 15 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Mitchell v. Mitchell, 695 N.E.2d 
920 (Ind. 1998). 
 279 See, e.g., Haynes v. First Nat’l State Bank of New Jersey, 432 A.2d 890, 
897 (N.J. 1981) (citing In re Rittenhouse’s Will, 117 A.2d 401, 402 (N.J. 1955)) 
(suggesting that “additional circumstances of a suspicious character” are required to 
raise the presumption of undue influence even where “the will benefits one who stood 
in a confidential relationship to the testat[or]”). 
 280 See, e.g., Enders v. Parker ex rel. Estate of Kottke (In re Estate of Kottke), 
6 P.3d 243, 244, 247-48 (Alaska 2000). 
 281 See, e.g., Pepin v. Ryan, 47 A.2d 846, 847 (Conn. 1946). 
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courts hold that the ultimate burden of persuasion shifts to the 
proponent;282 but the better view is that the contestant’s raising 
of the presumption shifts to the proponent only the burden of 
going forward with contrary evidence (that is, the burden of 
production).283 If the proponent has no contrary evidence, the 
contestant is, of course, entitled to a directed verdict.284 But if 
the proponent does produce contrary evidence, the presumption 
of undue influence dwindles to a mere inference of undue 
influence: an inference that the trier of fact may accept or 
reject after considering all the evidence produced by both sides 
(including the evidence the contestant used to raise the 
presumption) but leaving the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion 
with the contestant.285  
The proponent’s response to the contestant’s showing of 
undue influence can take different forms. For example, the 
proponent might present evidence contradicting the elements 
of the contestant’s case, such as the contestant’s claim that a 
confidential relationship existed between the influencer and 
the testator or the claim that the testator was peculiarly 
susceptible to undue influence.286 Or the proponent might 
present evidence going directly to the contestant’s underlying 
claim by showing that the will did indeed represent the 
testator’s own wishes, such as evidence that the testator had 
independent reasons for adopting a seemingly “unnatural” plan 
of disposition287 or evidence that the testator received truly 
independent legal advice from an attorney.288  
  
 282 See, e.g., Bernard v. Foley, 139 P.3d 1196, 1199 (Cal. 2006); In re Last Will 
and Testament of Melson, 711 A.2d 783, 784 (Del. 1998). 
 283 See e.g., Carpenter v. Carpenter (In re Estate of Carpenter), 253 So. 2d 697, 
704 (Fla. 1971); Franciscan Sisters Health Care Corp. v. Dean, 448 N.E.2d 872, 876 (Ill. 
1983); Guill v. Wolpert, 218 N.W.2d 224, 235 (Neb. 1974); Martin v. Phillips, 369 
S.E.2d 397, 401 (Va. 1988). 
 284 In re Estate of Henke, 561 N.E.2d 314, 317 (Ill. App. 1990). 
 285 Id.; see also Gillett v. Michigan United Traction Co., 171 N.W. 536, 538 
(Mich. 1919) (“It is now quite generally held by the courts that a rebuttable . . . 
presumption has no weight as evidence. It serves to establish a prima facie case; but, if 
challenged by rebutting evidence, the presumption cannot be weighed against the 
evidence. Supporting evidence must be introduced [by the party who previously 
invoked the presumption], and it then becomes a question of weighing the actual 
evidence introduced, without giving any evidential force to the presumption itself.”).  
 286 PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO WILLS, TRUSTS AND ADMINISTRATION 47 (2d 
ed. 1994). 
 287 See, e.g., In re Estate of Weickum, 317 N.W.2d 142, 146 (S.D. 1982). 
 288 Enders v. Parker ex rel. Estate of Kottke (In re Estate of Kottke), 6 P.3d 
243, 248 (Alaska 2000); In re Estate of Wright, 199 N.E.2d 54, 59 (Ill. App. 1964). 
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III. ERRONEOUS APPLICATION OF THESE STANDARDS IN 
CASES OF RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE 
American law should be no less concerned today about 
the “imposition upon pious . . . minds”289 than it was when 
mortmain statutes were still on the books. As recently as 2006, 
the North American Securities Association reported an 
increase in the fraudulent bilking of the faithful by religious 
organizations. “The scammers are getting smarter, and the 
investors don’t ask enough questions because of the feeling that 
they can be safe in church.”290 And one can hardly forget the 
appalling illustration of religious conversion’s power provided 
by the events in 1979 when “hundreds of members of the 
People’s Temple, after having given up homes and country to 
move to the jungles of Guyana, obeyed their leader Jim Jones’s 
commands to commit suicide and even to murder their children 
and reluctant comrades.”291 In the more placid world of 
testamentary transfers, modern courts have often prevented 
religion-based imposition upon testators by correctly applying 
the conventional rules of undue influence law.292 Of course, by 
correctly applying those rules, courts have sometimes found 
there to be no undue influence.293 But where courts have 
reasoned erroneously in religious undue influence cases, their 
error generally consists in holding either (1) that a testator 
cannot be unduly influenced by a clergyman’s remarks 
addressed to a whole congregation rather than to her alone; or 
(2) that a finding of undue influence in religion-based cases 
violates the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of 
religion. 
In the discussion that follows, I wish to disclaim any 
intention to treat a testator’s religious belief—however 
  
 289 Note I, Phila. Baptist Ass’n, supra note 101, at 22-23.  
 290 Swindlers Fleecing Faithful of Billions, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 14, 2006, at sec. 2, 
p. 3 (emphasis added) (quoting the president of the securities association). 
 291 C. DANIEL BATSON ET AL., RELIGION AND THE INDIVIDUAL: A SOCIAL-
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 32 (1993). 
 292 See, e.g., Estate of Hee v. Toth (In re Estate of Hee), 252 So. 2d 846, 847 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Bryan v. Norton, 265 S.E.2d 282, 283-84 (Ga. 1980); Suagee 
v. Cook (In re Estate of Maheras), 897 P.2d 268, 270 (Okla. 1995); Nelson v. Dodge, 68 
A.2d 51, 57-58 (R.I. 1949) (invalidating inter vivos transfers). The cited opinion in 
Bryan merely reversed a directed verdict in favor of the proponent and remanded the 
case with instructions to submit the issue of undue influence to the jury. 265 S.E.2d at 
284. That the contest was successful on remand was reported in a subsequent case 
involving attorney fees. See Bryan v. Granade, 357 S.E.2d 92, 93 (Ga. 1987). 
 293 See, e.g., Doyle v. Clancy (In re McIntyre’s Estate), 159 N.W. 517, 524 
(Mich. 1916); Caughey v. Bridenbagh, 57 A. 821, 828-29 (Pa. 1904). 
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unconventional it may be or however rigidly it may be held—as 
a form of delusion suggestive of mental incapacity. While some 
courts maintain that religious belief never can be considered 
evidence of incapacity,294 others take a less absolute view and 
hold that “a man may, through manifestations of religious 
belief, evidence mental disorder.”295 By confining the discussion 
to undue influence, however, we can avoid inquiries into the 
reasonableness of particular religious beliefs inasmuch as 
statements can constitute undue influence even if they are 
true.296 Thus, if clergyman Smith says to the testator, “The Lord 
wants you to leave all your money to my church,” such conduct 
should constitute undue influence if it overcomes the testator’s 
free agency and causes her to execute a church-favoring will 
that she would not otherwise have executed, even if Smith is 
factually correct about the Lord’s wishes.297 Undue influence 
does not mean fraud.298 Nor does it mean malevolence; Smith’s 
conduct can still constitute undue influence even if it is 
motivated only by concern for the salvation of the testator’s 
soul since beneficence of motive does not rule out undue 
influence.299  
A. The Unwarranted Requirement of Personal Contact 
In In re Cotcher’s Estate,300 the testator had bequeathed 
one-third of her residuary estate to a Catholic orphanage and 
two-thirds to the pastor of her local Catholic cathedral for the 
benefit of a local parochial school. This will was prepared for 
  
 294 See, e.g., Minturn v. Conception Abbey, 61 S.W.2d 352, 359 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1933). 
 295 See, e.g., Ingersoll v. Gourley, 139 P. 207, 209 (Wash. 1914); Henderson v. 
Jackson, 111 N.W. 821, 822-23 (Iowa 1907). The Henderson court wrote: 
It is true that if there be other circumstances fairly tending to show 
unsoundness of mind, . . . all these peculiarities of life and conduct, religious 
or otherwise, will properly be a matter of inquiry, and may in some instances 
furnish legitimate support to a verdict or judgment against the validity of a 
will. But standing alone, we think no case can be found in which it has been 
held that such peculiarities of the testator are sufficient to impeach his 
testamentary capacity . . . . 
Id. at 823. 
 296 See supra text accompanying note 246. 
 297 Cf. supra text accompanying note 97, to the effect that the value of religion 
does not depend on the objective truth of its tenets. 
 298 See supra text accompanying notes 247-248. 
 299 See supra text accompanying note 212. 
 300 In re Cotcher’s Estate, 264 N.W. 325, 325-26 (Mich. 1936). 
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her by the attorney for the local Roman Catholic bishop.301 The 
will was contested on the ground of undue influence.302 While 
the court conceded that the Roman Catholic priest charged 
with exerting the influence had visited her in her home and 
had, from the pulpit, advised his parishioners that for the 
benefit of their own souls and those of their predecessors it 
would be wise to make financial donations to the Church or its 
institutions,303 the court rejected the contestants’ claim of 
undue influence on the ground that the priest’s solicitations 
“were made to all parishioners alike” rather than to the 
testator as an individual.304  
The Cotcher court’s distinction overlooks the extraordi-
nary power that pastoral exhortations can exert upon the 
members of a congregation to whom the exhortations are 
addressed.305 The Internal Revenue Service certainly recognizes 
that power when it challenges the income tax exemption of a 
church whose minister, from the pulpit, exhorts his 
parishioners to vote for (or against) a particular political 
candidate.306 If a testator’s pricks of conscience stemming from 
  
 301 Id. at 326. The testator had executed two previous wills. Id. Curiously, 
while the court implies that these earlier wills were drafted by someone other than the 
bishop’s attorney, the court does not indicate whether the religious bequests made in 
the last will were included in the prior wills. Id. I describe the court’s omission as 
curious because any substantial increase in religious bequests reflected in that third 
will might be a “suspicious circumstance” not inconsistent with a charge of undue 
influence. See supra text accompanying note 277 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 cmt. h (2003)). 
 302  In re Cotcher’s Estate, 264 N.W. at 325. 
 303 Id. at 326. 
 304 Id. at 327; accord Roberts-Douglas v. Meares, 624 A.2d 405, 421 (D.C. 
1992), modified on other grounds and reaff’d, 624 A.2d 431 (D.C. 1993) (“If the only 
connection between donor and donee is that the former sits in a church pew, listens to 
the latter’s sermon, and conscientiously makes a contribution, the occasion for special 
scrutiny does not arise.”). The court did acknowledge, however, that exhortations from 
the pulpit might weaken an individual’s resolve so as to make him more susceptible to 
one-on-one influence than he otherwise would have been. Id. at 424. 
 305 In Roberts-Douglas, the court stated that “[s]ermons by [a bishop] to his 
entire flock . . . are not the stuff from which a confidential relationship is derived.” 624 
A.2d at 422. 
 306 The income received by a not-for-profit religious organization can be 
exempt from federal income tax pursuant to section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue 
Code, but the organization must forfeit its 501(c)(3) exemption if it “participate[s] in, or 
intervene[s] in . . . any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any 
candidate for public office.” I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986). Thus, in Christian Echoes 
National Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), it was held that 
the Internal Revenue Service acted properly in revoking the taxpayer’s § 501(c)(3) tax-
exemption, where the taxpayer had “used its publications and broadcasts to attack 
candidates and incumbents who were considered too liberal. It attacked President 
Kennedy in 1961 and urged its followers to elect conservatives like Senator Strom 
Thurmond . . . .” Id. at 856. 
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the pleas of a person now dead can support a finding of undue 
influence,307 it seems no stretch to conclude that pricks of 
conscience stemming from a clergyman’s exhortations to his 
congregation can support such a finding. I am not suggesting 
that statements from a pulpit necessarily constitute undue 
influence, but merely that they are capable of doing so and 
should not be excluded as the Cotcher case excluded them.308  
Clergymen are certainly aware of the powerful influence 
they can wield from the pulpit. When it seemed likely that 
Congress would amend the federal hate crimes statute to add 
sexual orientation to the list of hatreds warranting enhanced 
penalties if they motivated violent crimes, a number of 
clergymen expressed the fear that their anti-gay sermons 
might subject them to hate crime prosecutions if their sermons 
spurred congregants to violent action. One pastor stated, “I 
don’t believe the Bible condones gay lifestyles. Yet the way 
these laws would be invoked would be that whoever is a 
commander or director of this kind of action can be brought up 
on the same charges as the actual perpetrator of a crime.”309 
The court in Cotcher offered another justification for its 
per se rule exempting the priest’s pulpit exhortations: “This 
method of raising money for churches . . . prevails throughout 
  
  Two days before the 2004 presidential election, the Reverend George 
Regas, a guest preacher at All Saints Episcopal Church in Pasadena, California, 
preached a fiery sermon in which he imagined Jesus talking to George W. Bush and 
John Kerry and sharply condemning the Bush administration’s prosecution of the war 
in Iraq. Father Regas then urged the congregants to “bring a sensitive conscience to the 
ballot box” and to “vote your deepest values.” http://www.ombwatch.org/article/ 
articleview/3167. A week after the election, the Internal Revenue Service notified the 
church that it considered the sermon to be a possible violation of the § 501(c)(3) 
restriction on political activity in opposition to a candidate, and that it was considering 
the revocation of the church’s tax exemption. In September 2007, the IRS finally 
informed the church that it was not going to pursue revoking the church’s tax 
exemption, but the IRS stated that the sermon did in fact constitute a violation of the 
restrictions in § 501(c)(3). Rebecca Trounson, Pasadena Church Wants Apology from 
IRS, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2007. Whether or not the IRS originally acted out of partisan 
malice and whether or not the Service interpreted the statute correctly, its intervention 
in the case was a clear acknowledgment of the strong influence that a pastor’s “mere” 
sermon might have on the future actions of his listeners. 
 307 See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
 308 I believe that the court in Cotcher decided correctly when it upheld the 
validity of the will, but the court should have reached that decision by noting the 
testator’s undoubted free agency, not by noting the absence of one-on-one contact. 
 309 Howard Witt, Anti-Hate Law Shifts Debate on Gays, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 13, 
2007, at 1, 14 (emphasis added) (quoting Bishop Harry Jackson, pastor of Hope 
Christian Church of Beltsville, Maryland, who joined three dozen other pastors to buy 
a full-page advertisement in USA Today denouncing the proposed amendment to the 
hate crimes statute). 
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all Christendom.”310 Such a justification cannot be allowed to 
stand. That a course of conduct is common has no bearing on 
whether that conduct, in a particular case, overpowered the 
particular testator and destroyed her free agency. Pleading and 
solicitation are common enough behaviors, even among the 
laity. Sometimes they amount to undue influence,311 and 
sometimes they do not.312  
[T]he mere fact that arguments and suggestions are adopted by a 
testator, and his will, on that account, is different from what it 
otherwise would have been, is not sufficient [for a finding of undue 
influence]. It necessarily depends upon the further question as to 
whether such advice or suggestions are intelligently and freely 
adopted, because they have appealed to the judgment of the testator, 
so as to become in accordance with his own desires, or whether 
because of the persistency of the importunity, or for any other 
reason, the testator is unable to resist, and finally yields, not 
because of the voluntary action of his own judgment, but because, on 
account of the strength of the influence, or the weakness of his own 
judgment and will, he cannot resist longer. It is undoubtedly true, as 
has been argued, that in some cases it may be very difficult to 
determine whether a suggestion has been thus freely adopted, or has 
been merely followed by the testator because it has overcome his free 
agency; but it is none the less the true and decisive question, and 
must be determined as well as possible in each case from all the facts 
and circumstances of the case. The citation of authorities in support 
of these statements of the rule is unnecessary, because such 
authorities are so exceedingly numerous.313  
B. Needless Concerns About the First Amendment314 
Even five decades after Cotcher was decided, judges in 
will contests continued to treat statements from the pulpit with 
special indulgence, but they did so in the belief that the First 
Amendment required such indulgence. The Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia, in Roberts-Douglas v. Meares,315 
was confronted with some rather extreme declarations from the 
  
 310 In re Cotcher’s Estate, 264 N.W. 325, 327 (Mich. 1936). It was actually the 
trial court that first used these words, but the Michigan Supreme Court explicitly 
endorsed and repeated them. 
 311 See, e.g., Greuner v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. (In re Greuner’s 
Estate), 87 P.2d 872 (Cal. App. 1939). 
 312 See, e.g., In re Campbell’s Will, 60 A. 880 (Me. 1905). 
 313 Id. at 881. 
 314 The freedom of religion clause of the First Amendment applies to the 
several states as well as to the federal government. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 
296, 303 (1940). 
 315 624 A.2d 405 (D.C. 1992), modified on other grounds and reaff’d, 624 A.2d 
431 (D.C. 1993). 
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pulpit, including statements by the congregation’s bishop that 
“God would punish those who failed to make adequate 
contributions.”316 Despite the likelihood that such statements 
played a determinative role in inducing parishioners to make 
gifts to the bishop’s Evangel Temple, the court cautioned: 
“When such remarks are directed from the pulpit to the 
congregation as a whole, . . . any attempt to use the sermon as 
a basis for setting aside a gift [on undue influence grounds] 
implicates significant First Amendment concerns.”317  
“Implicates” is a weasel word; everything implicates 
First Amendment concerns.318 What the Roberts-Douglas court 
presumably meant, but was too fainthearted to say, is that 
even when a clergyman’s statements from the pulpit unduly 
pressure a parishioner to execute a will in the clergyman’s (or 
in his church’s) favor, a probate court would violate the 
freedom of religion clause if it barred such a bequest from 
taking effect. Such an understanding of freedom of religion is 
incorrect. In In re The Bible Speaks,319 for example, in which a 
donor sought to rescind on undue influence grounds several 
inter vivos gifts made to a religious organization called The 
Bible Speaks (“TBS”), the Federal Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit explicitly rejected the notion that the free exercise 
clause shields from attack on undue influence grounds the 
solicitation of funds by a religious organization.320 The court 
reasoned, “Those who run TBS may freely exercise their 
religion, but they cannot use the cloak of religion to exert 
undue influence of a non-religious nature with impunity.”321  
Of course, to characterize TBS’s conduct as “non-
religious” somewhat begs the question. How did the court 
conclude that TBS’s fundraising activities were non-religious 
(and therefore outside the protection of the free exercise 
clause)? Some of those activities consisted of lying—for 
  
 316 Roberts-Douglas, 624 A.2d at 410. 
 317 Id. at 422. 
 318 Cf. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., 
519 U.S. 316 (1997). In that case, the Supreme Court was asked to interpret the 
breadth of a federal preemption statute, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (“ERISA”) § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). Id. at 39. Following the pattern 
of previous cases, the majority focused its attention on the statutory phrase “relate to.” 
Id. Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, argued that “relate to” offers no guidance or 
limitation at all inasmuch as “everything is related to everything else.” Id. at 335. 
 319 Dovydenas v. The Bible Speaks, 869 F.2d 628, 642 (1st Cir.1989). 
 320 Id. at 645-46. The issue of undue influence was decided on the basis of 
Massachusetts law. See id. at 641. 
 321 Id. at 645. 
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example, telling the donor that her previous gift to TBS had 
miraculously cured a TBS member’s migraine headaches when 
in fact the members making that statement knew quite well 
that the headaches had continued unabated322—and the court 
had little difficulty finding that freedom of religion did not 
include the freedom to lie. But some of TBS’s statements were 
arguably religious; at least, they were phrased using 
conventional religious idiom and were not susceptible of logical 
or evidentiary disproof. For example, according to testimony, 
the head of TBS (Pastor Stevens) and his subordinates isolated 
the donor from her husband (who had opposed her donations) 
and told her that she should keep her gifts to TBS secret from 
her husband and that her husband’s family and her family 
“were evil and were controlled by Satan and demons.”323 
According to testimony, Stevens told the donor that her largest 
gift to TBS “would be particularly influential in shaping the 
world for the return of God.”324 That these statements—made 
with undeniably religious terms—were held to evidence TBS’s 
undue influence suggests that the case should be read as 
holding that solicitations for contributions are inherently non-
religious and therefore unprotected by the Free Exercise 
Clause, even if the solicitors’ religion deems the fundraising 
activities to be theologically required. 
The law of undue influence focuses on a testator’s 
response to conduct. While the Free Exercise Clause embraces 
both the freedom to believe and the freedom to act, it is only 
the latter freedom that is implicated in undue influence cases, 
and that latter freedom is not absolute.325 When a religious 
person’s freedom to act in accordance with that religion is 
burdened by a federal or state law, that law passes 
constitutional muster—even in the absence of a compelling 
governmental interest—if the burden is an “incidental effect” of 
a “law that is neutral and of general applicability.”326 The law of 
undue influence is indeed religiously neutral and of general 
applicability. It makes no distinction between religious 
  
 322 Id. at 633-34. 
 323 Id. at 632. 
 324 Id. at 635. 
 325 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (“[The First] 
Amendment embraces two concepts,—freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first 
is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.”). 
 326 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993). 
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influencers and secular influencers.327 It was not designed to 
suppress the beliefs of any particular religion.328 It does not 
involve an inquiry into the truth or falsity of the beliefs of any 
religion.329 Consequently, the law of undue influence applies to 
the grasping clergyman no less than to the grasping nephew. 
No “balancing test”—comparing societal benefit with religious 
burden—is to be undertaken. 
The Bible Speaks case was decided before (though only 
shortly before) the Supreme Court rejected “balancing tests” for 
neutral laws of general applicability.330 Accordingly, the Bible 
Speaks court may have thought that its rejection of the 
proponents’ freedom of religion argument required a finding 
that fundraising was inherently nonreligious. Certainly 
conduct motivated by pecuniary considerations was, even 
according to prior Supreme Court precedents, “particularly 
suspect.”331  
C. A Recommended Per Se Rule for Spiritual Advisors 
Evidence suggests that the cases in which religious 
undue influence is found to have occurred generally involve 
nontraditional religions,332 while the cases in which such 
  
 327 See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 621, 629 (1978) (declaring 
unconstitutional a state law barring any “Minister of the Gospel, or priest of any 
denomination whatever” from serving as delegates to the state’s constitutional 
convention). 
 328 In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, the Supreme Court declared 
unconstitutional a city ordinance that prohibited ritual animal sacrifice. 508 U.S. at 
547. The ordinance’s defect was its motivation: the suppression of a particular religious 
community. Id. at 534-35. 
 329 The Freedom of Religion Clause bars courts from inquiring into the truth 
or falsity of a religious belief. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944). But 
truth or falsity is not an issue in undue influence cases; a statement can constitute 
undue influence even if it is factually true. See supra text accompanying notes 246-248. 
 330 The first case generally thought to have rejected the balancing test 
approach was Employment Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-
84 (1990). That Roberts-Douglas was decided after Smith and Ballard rejected any 
balancing test makes quite surprising the Roberts-Douglas court’s warnings about the 
First Amendment. See supra text accompanying note 317. 
 331 Richard Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion 
Under the First Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 42 (1977). 
 332 See, e.g., Dovydenas v. The Bible Speaks, 869 F.2d 628, 624, 631 (1st Cir. 
1989), (a religious group calling itself “The Bible Speaks”); Roberts-Douglas v. Meares, 
624 A.2d 405, 408 (D.C. 1992), modified and reaff’d, 624 A.2d 431 (D.C. 1993) (the 
“Evangel Temple”); Carpenter v. Horace Mann Life Ins. Co., 730 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Ark. 
Ct. App. 1987) (proponent professed to be a spiritual healer); Hartley v. Toth (In re 
Estate of Hee), 252 So. 2d 846, 847 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (Jehovah’s Witnesses); 
Nelson v. Dodge, 68 A.2d 51, 53 (R.I. 1949) (“The Church of Jesus, Inc.”). Contra 
Corrigan v. Pironi, 23 A. 355, 355-56 (N.J. 1891) (setting aside on undue influence 
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influence is found not to have occurred generally involve 
mainstream religions.333 One scholar, at least, would probably 
find this evidence unsurprising—“I suspect that judgments 
about which forms of religious influence are ‘undue’ will often 
(though not always) lead to improper consideration of whether 
the religion seems unreasonable, excessively authoritarian, or 
too threatening of extratemporal consequences [i.e., 
punishment after death]”334—and he therefore cautions against 
any undue influence inquiries in will contests involving 
religious bequests.335 I share his reluctance to distinguish 
  
grounds an inter vivos transfer to a Roman Catholic priest); Suagee v. Cook (In re 
Estate of Maheras), 897 P.2d 268, 270, 274-75 (Okla. 1995) (a successful contest where 
proponent was a Baptist minister); see also Bryan v. Norton, 265 S.E.2d 282, 283 (Ga. 
1980) (a successful contest in which the proponent was identified only as a “pastor of 
the church which the testatrix attended”). 
 333 See, e.g., Else v. Fremont Methodist Church, 73 N.W.2d 50, 51, 59-60 (Iowa 
1955); Waggener v. Gen. Ass’n of Baptists in Ky., 306 S.W.2d 271, 272, 274 (Ky. 1957); 
Doyle v. Clancy (In re McIntyre’s Estate), 159 N.W. 517, 517, 519, 524 (Mich. 1916) 
(Roman Catholicism); Martin v. Bowdern, 59 S.W. 227. 228, 232 (Mo. 1900) (Roman 
Catholicism); First Christian Church in Salem v. McReynolds, 241 P.2d 135, 136-37, 
142 (Or. 1952); In re Rowlands’ [sic] Estate, 18 N.W.2d 290, 291, 294 (S.D. 1945) 
(Roman Catholicism); Naihaus v. Feigon, 244 S.W.2d 325, 326, 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1951) (Judaism). But see Stanchfield v. Stanchfield (In re Estate of Stenerson), 348 
N.W.2d 141, 142, 144 (N.D. 1984) (informal Bible study group held not to have exerted 
undue influence). 
  In support of its conclusion that a Roman Catholic priest’s exhortations did 
not constitute undue influence, one court noted that the priest’s exhortations did not go 
“beyond the teachings of the church.” In re Cotcher’s Estate, 264 N.W. 325, 327 (Mich. 
1936). 
 334 Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions—A 
Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 627 n.100 (1999). 
 335 Id. Professor Volokh may undercut the persuasive force of his warning by 
citing as support Carpenter v. Horace Mann Life Ins. Co., 730 S.W.2d 502 (Ark. App. 
1987), a case that, to me, cries out for the relief of the undue influence finding that the 
court quite properly made.. The testator in Carpenter was raised a Catholic and 
“considered by her family to be very religious.” Id. at 503. She worked as a registered 
nurse and put her husband (who converted to Catholicism to marry her) through 
college. Id. They had one son. Id. She entered into a correspondence with Carpenter.  
His doctrine is somewhat unclear from the record but appears to have 
involved delving into the metaphysical in an effort to get closer to God and 
included reincarnation, soul mates, and meditation. He apparently did not 
advocate the study of the Bible. He did advocate tithing, however. . . . 
Carpenter’s wife, Sherry, wrote letters to [Testator] in which she claimed that 
Carpenter was able to transmigrate, did not have to eat or perform other 
bodily functions, could heal himself and others, and had other supernatural 
powers. . . . From testimony of his other followers, it appears that Carpenter 
and Sherry also convinced his “disciples” that he could control their lives from 
afar and, if they didn’t want bad things to happen to them, they must give 
more and more of their money to him for his “work.”  
Id. The testator and her husband had frequent disagreements about money; he resisted 
her sending money to Carpenter. Carpenter sent the testator a letter enclosing an 
astrological chart for her; the entry for July 1975 (sent in Dec. 1973) said that it was a 
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“reasonable” religious beliefs from “unreasonable” ones,336 but I 
do not share his reluctance to subject religious bequests to 
undue influence analysis. And since I have no reason to 
suppose that members of mainstream religions are more 
strong-willed or independent-minded than members of 
nontraditional religions, I cannot but suspect that mainstream 
religions’ greater success in undue influence cases can be 
traced to an erroneous—and overly lenient—application of 
undue influence law.337 We must correct this error. Human 
nature is unlikely to have changed markedly since the days of 
the repealed mortmain statutes, when legislators feared that 
some religious leaders were taking advantage of the faithful,338 
and I remain unwilling to obey the testamentary instructions 
of a person whose free will was overcome by the conduct of 
another. 
The best solution to this problem of clerical over-
reaching is to treat all relationships between a testator and her 
spiritual advisor as per se confidential for purposes of the law 
of undue influence. Not only would such a solution recognize 
the enormous power of religious influence339 and thereby 
prevent undue leniency in the face of undue influence by 
  
favorable period “to begin undertaking new friendships.” Id. at 504. Carpenter urged 
her to get a divorce and join his family. Testator did divorce her husband: in July 1975! 
Id. She moved to Carpenter’s town. Id. By this time she was giving Carpenter 
approximately seventy-five percent of all her earnings. Id. Her will left him everything. 
Id.  
  Two psychologists who reviewed the letters between Testator and her 
parents and between Testator and the Carpenters and reviewed the depositions of 
several witnesses “concluded that [Testator] had a very dependent personality, was 
searching for a father figure to care for her and that Carpenter fit her needs 
perfectly. . . . Both testified that it was not their belief that Carpenter had actually 
knowingly attempted to extort money from [Testator]. . . . It was their opinion that he 
was not intentionally a ‘con artist’ but that his teachings had this effect on gullible 
women. . . . [He] encouraged them to give him money for his ‘work’ and free him from 
the necessity of holding a job so he could devote his entire time and energy to his 
teaching and writing. Both psychologists concluded that because of Carpenter’s mental 
hold on [Testator], the veiled threats that if she left him something terrible might 
happen to her, . . . she was not free to fully exercise her own independence . . . . [and 
was] under the influence of Carpenter.” Id. at 504-05. “The record supports a finding 
that there was a systematic alienation of [Testator] from her husband, son, parent, and 
siblings.” Id. at 508. 
  If that is not undue influence, I do not know what is. 
 336 The rules of undue influence, properly applied, do not require such a 
distinction to be made. See text at supra note 296. 
 337 That a court seemed willing to exempt from undue-influence examination a 
practice that “prevails throughout all Christendom” illustrates the unwarranted 
leniency to which I refer. See supra note 310 and accompanying text. 
 338 See supra note 18. 
 339 See, e.g., BATSON ET AL., supra note 291, at 198, 296. 
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mainstream clergyman,340 it would also guard against the 
temptation to assess the reasonableness of any religious or 
spiritual beliefs. The contestant would need to produce 
evidence only as to the category into which the alleged 
influencer fell (together with evidence of a “suspicious 
circumstance”341); the inquiry would then turn, with the 
proponent having the burden of production, to the 
fundamental—and purely secular—issue of whether the will 
represented the testator’s own wishes.342  
One can find the occasional case that already does treat 
the relationship between a testator and her spiritual advisor as 
per se confidential,343 but most courts currently view the 
question as one of fact, to be decided on a case by case basis.344 
Accordingly, the creation of the per se rule that I recommend 
would represent a change in the law for most jurisdictions. At 
least one court has opined that such a change would require 
legislative action,345 but legislatures have acted along these 
lines before. Idaho, for example, enacted a statute providing 
that a bequest to a nursing home where the testator was in 
residence shall be presumed to have been the result of undue 
  
 340 A transfer might be set aside on undue influence grounds where a 
confidential relationship existed that would not be set aside in the absence of a 
confidential relationship. Roberts-Douglas v. Meares, 624 A.2d 405, 421 (D.C. 1992), 
modified on other grounds and reaff’d, 624 A.2d 431 (D.C. 1993). 
 341 See supra text accompanying note 252. 
 342 See supra text accompanying note 254. 
 343 See, e.g., Nelson v. Dodge, 68 A.2d 51, 57 (R.I. 1949) (inter vivos transfer); 
In re Rowland’s Estate, 18 N.W.2d 290, 293 (S.D. 1945). 
 344 See, e.g., Else v. Fremont Methodist Church, 73 N.W.2d 50, 57 (Iowa 1955); 
First Christian Church in Salem v. McReynolds, 241 P.2d 135, 142 (Or. 1952); Barlowe 
v. Brevard, 213 S.W.3d 298, 304 (Tenn. App. 2006); see also In re The Bible Speaks, 869 
F.2d 628, 641-42 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989) (“Massachusetts has never 
directly addressed the question of whether a pastor-communicant relationship is per se 
a confidential one when undue influence is alleged. We need not decide whether 
Massachusetts would hold that the pastor-communicant is by itself a confidential 
relationship. Here, we have found such a relationship on the basis of other 
factors . . . .”). 
 345 See Miller v. Kraft (In re Estate of Wagner), 265 N.W.2d 459, 464 (N.D. 
1984) (“[I]f a presumption is to be created providing that undue influence is presumed 
whenever the attorney who drew the will is also directly or indirectly a substantial 
beneficiary under the will[,] it should be accomplished by a legislative act rather than 
by a judicial decree.”). In point of fact, since the attorney-client relationship is a 
confidential relationship and since being a substantial beneficiary is a “suspicious 
circumstance,” see supra text accompanying notes 278-281, virtually every American 
jurisdiction would—as a matter of judge-made law—find that those facts give rise to a 
presumption of undue influence, so I am puzzled why the North Dakota law of undue 
influence was thought to have a lacuna that only legislative action could fill. 
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influence, and only clear and convincing evidence to the 
contrary can rebut that presumption.346  
So far as I know, the per se rules in Rhode Island and 
South Dakota—treating all relationships between testators and 
their spiritual advisors as confidential relationships347—have 
not been challenged on freedom of religion grounds. But should 
they be challenged? That is, would my proposed per se rule 
survive a challenge based on freedom of religion? Clearly, such 
a rule would be neither neutral nor of general applicability;348 
rather, it would specially target religion-based relationships 
and treat them differently from most secular relationships. To 
pass muster under the Freedom of Religion Clause, such a rule, 
said the United States Supreme Court in Church of Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, “must be justified by a compelling 
governmental interest [as opposed to being merely reasonable] 
and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.”349 In 
other words, the rule should be subject to strict scrutiny.350  
The state governmental interest at issue here is “the 
orderly settlement of estates and the dependability of titles to 
property passing under [wills or] intestacy laws.”351 Clearly, the 
settlement of estates would not be orderly if serious doubt 
existed among interested family members as to the 
genuineness or trustworthiness of a purported will, and titles 
to property would remain unreliable as long as such doubts 
remained unresolved.352 But is such an interest “compelling?” 
The United States Supreme Court has characterized it as 
“substantial,”353 but such a characterization does not preclude 
its being “compelling” as well. The Court made the 
characterization in an unsuccessful challenge, on “equal 
protection” grounds, to a statute affecting the inheritance 
rights of nonmarital children: a group whose interests require 
  
 346 IDAHO CODE § 15-2-616 (2007). 
 347 See supra text accompanying note 343. 
 348 See supra note 326. 
 349 508 U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993). 
 350 Perhaps the initial case applying strict scrutiny analysis to a statute 
arguably impinging on the freedom of religion was Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 
406-07 (1963), where state law denied the petitioner unemployment compensation 
because her unemployment resulted from her refusal to violate her religious principles 
by working on Saturdays. The law was declared unconstitutional. 
 351 Lalli v. Lalli (In re Estate of Lalli), 371 N.E.2d 481, 482-83 (N.Y. 1977), 
aff’d sub nom. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 264 (1978). 
 352 See supra text accompanying notes 195-199. 
 353 Lalli, 439 U.S. at 271 (plurality opinion). 
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only “intermediate scrutiny”354 of potentially discriminatory 
state actions, and under the immediate scrutiny standard a 
“substantial” state interest is good enough.355 It was 
unnecessary for the Court to determine whether the interest 
rose to the level of being compelling.356  
Certainly one can adduce examples of state interests 
that have been found sufficiently compelling to justify 
incidental burdens on the free exercise of religion. In Braunfeld 
v. Brown,357 a state’s “interest in providing one uniform day of 
rest for all workers”358 was held to justify Sunday closing laws, 
even though such laws made more expensive the religious 
beliefs of business owners whose religion required them to close 
on Saturdays as well.359 In Hernandez v. Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, the federal government’s “interest in 
maintaining a sound tax system free of myriad exceptions 
flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs” was held to 
justify the denial of an income tax charitable deduction for 
payments for “training” and “auditing” sessions made 
mandatory by a particular religion.360 Difficult as it may be to 
compare apples and oranges, it seems intuitively correct to say 
that a state’s interest in the orderly settlement of estates and 
the dependability of titles to property ought to be no less 
compelling than its interest in providing a uniform day of rest 
or maintaining a sound tax system. 
A useful approach to the problem of identifying the 
kinds of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause is 
suggested by language in the majority opinion in Sherbert v. 
Verner.361 The case involved a South Carolina statute that 
  
 354 See In re Estate of Lalli, 371 N.E.2d at 482-83. The Supreme Court of 
Appeals of West Virginia held that—under that state’s constitution—nonmarital 
children were a “suspect classification” requiring strict scrutiny of any state statute 
treating them differently from marital children. Adkins v. McEldowney, 280 S.E.2d 
231, 233 (W. Va. 1981). 
 355 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 688 (7th ed. 
2004). 
 356 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts seems to have characterized 
such a state interest as “compelling,” though evidently the characterization was made 
for state constitutional purposes, not federal. Lowell v. Kowalski, 405 N.E.2d 135, 140 
(Mass. 1980) (citing Commonwealth v. MacKenzie, 334 N.E.2d 613, 616 (Mass. 1975)). 
 357 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
 358 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408 (1963). 
 359 Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 609. 
 360 Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699-700 (1989) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 
(1982)). 
 361  Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398. 
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denied an unemployed person certain insurance benefits if her 
unemployed status was prolonged, without good cause, by her 
failure to accept available work.362 The petitioner in the case 
refused on religious grounds to work on Saturdays, and her 
refusal prolonged her unemployed status.363 The Court held 
that the state’s denial of unemployment insurance benefits in 
her case violated her rights under the Freedom of Religion 
Clause. In reaching that result, the Court noted that refusing 
to work on Saturdays was a “basic tenet” of her religion,364 and 
that the state law violated her freedom of religion because it 
“force[d] her to choose between following the precepts of her 
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and 
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept 
work, on the other hand.”365 Similarly, in a successful 
constitutional challenge to a city requirement forbidding police 
officers to wear beards brought by Muslim officers whose 
religious beliefs compelled them to wear beards,366 the court of 
appeals took pains to find that the wearing of beards was a 
fundamental requirement of Sunni Islam;367 accordingly, the 
invalidated requirement would have forced these men to choose 
between (1) keeping their jobs (by committing a “sin”368) and 
(2) following their religious beliefs and losing their jobs. 
My proposed presumption does not put anyone in such a 
dilemma. Clergymen do not have to choose between speaking 
about bequests (and thereby forfeiting them) and remaining 
silent. The faithful do not have to choose between yielding to 
persuasion (and having their gifts annulled) and making no 
religious gifts at all. The presumption is intended to reach only 
those instances where a clergyman’s conduct has destroyed a 
testator’s free agency, and courts should be suspicious of any 
claim that the destruction of a congregant’s free agency is a 
“basic tenet” of any religion.369  
  
 362  Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401. 
 363  Id. at 399-400. 
 364 Id. at 400 n.1. 
 365 Id. at 404 (emphasis added). 
 366 Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 
F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 367 Id. at 360-61. 
 368 Id. at 360. 
 369 Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 
(1981) (“One can, of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly 
nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise 
Clause” (emphasis added)). 
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My proposed presumption likewise satisfies the 
requirement of being “narrowly tailored.”370 It recognizes the 
extraordinary power of religion and it recognizes the state’s 
interest in distributing property only on the basis of reliable 
indicia of intent, but it does not prohibit bequests to religious 
actors or institutions. It does not even create a presumption of 
invalidity (which the Idaho nursing home statute does).371 It 
mandates that the relationship between a testator and her 
spiritual advisor be considered per se confidential, but even the 
confidentiality designation does not give rise to a presumption 
of invalidity unless the contestant can produce evidence of a 
“suspicious circumstance,” such as active participation in the 
procurement of the will. Even then, the result is only a 
presumption of invalidity, and it can be rebutted. 
The First Amendment does not require that the income 
of religious organizations be exempt from federal income tax. 
That it is in fact exempt is merely a matter of legislative 
grace.372 Accordingly, the government is permitted to make 
substantial inquiries into a religious organization’s activities in 
order to determine whether the organization is entitled to its 
claimed exemption, including inquiries as to the content and 
intended effect of the organization’s publications or 
statements.373 The rights to bequeath and inherit property are 
likewise matters of legislative grace.374 A state could 
constitutionally abolish the right of testation, requiring all of a 
decedent’s property to pass to natural persons under the 
intestacy statute.375 Accordingly, a testator’s power to bequeath 
property to a religious charity exists at the sufferance of the 
state and may accordingly be subject to conditions, so long as 
the conditions do not operate to inhibit or deter the exercise of 
constitutionally protected freedoms376 and as long as the 
conditions operate similarly in the case of all religions rather 
than favoring one religion over another.377  
  
 370 See supra text accompanying note 350. 
 371 See supra note 228. 
 372 See Better Bus. Bureau of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326 
U.S. 279 (1945); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934); Christian 
Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972). 
 373 Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, 470 F.2d at 855-56. 
 374 See supra note 183. 
 375 See supra text accompanying note 197. 
 376 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405 (1963). 
 377 Golden Rule Church Ass’n v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 719, 729 (1964). 
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The proposed per se rule does require courts to 
distinguish those persons who are dispensing religious or 
spiritual advice to a testator from those who are acting as 
advisors in some other capacity, but distinguishing the 
religious from the nonreligious is a necessary and familiar 
judicial duty. “Though litigation of the question whether a 
given group or set of beliefs is or is not religious is a delicate 
business, our legal system sometimes requires it.”378  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Courts and legislatures have, for centuries, been wary of 
bequests to religious organizations or leaders. Concern that 
such bequests reflected merely the deathbed fears of the 
faithful manipulated by the clergy led legislatures to enact 
mortmain statutes. But such statutes were not only 
unworkable; they sometimes invalidated perfectly genuine 
religious bequests. The law of undue influence remains a 
worthy tool for ensuring the legitimacy of such bequests, but it 
can best serve as protection if relationships between testators 
and their spiritual advisors are deemed to be per se 
confidential. Such a per se rule, which recognizes the 
extraordinary power of religious influence (for good and for ill), 
would allocate more sensibly the risks of nonpersuasion. Under 
it, the proponent of the will, after the contestant presented 
evidence of a “suspicious circumstance” such as a substantial 
bequest in favor of the influencer, would have the burden of 
producing evidence that the bequest represented the testator’s 
actual wishes.  
 
  
 378 Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D.C. v. United States, 409 
F.2d 1146, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (footnote omitted). 
